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SUFFICIENCY OF PROVOCATION FOR VOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER IN NEW MEXICO: PROBLEMS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE
LEO M. ROMERO*

I. INTRODUCTION

Jury instructions for the crime of voluntary manslaughter have become
an important issue for New Mexico appellate courts.' Recent cases presented the issue of what evidentiary showing at trial is necessary to require
the uniform jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The answers the
courts supplied show differing approaches to the problem and suggest the
need to reexamine the function of voluntary manslaughter in the homicide
law of New Mexico. This article will examine the standard used by recent
cases to determine whether instructions on voluntary manslaughter should
be presented to the jury in a murder prosecution and the application of
this standard to evidence presented in each case.
II. BACKGROUND

Cases concerned with the relationship between murder and manslaughter present significant and recurring issues in the criminal law of New
Mexico. Before analyzing these issues, it is important to set forth the
position of voluntary manslaughter in New Mexico homicide law, as it
is understood in theory and used in practice.
"Voluntary manslaughter" is one of four classifications of homicide
in the New Mexico Criminal Code. 2 The Code distinguishes among the
four types of homicide for the purpose of allocating different punishments
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico; A.B. 1965, Oberlin College; J.D. 1968, Washington
University, St. Louis; LL.M. 1972, Georgetown University. Special thanks are due to Professor Lee
Teitelbaum, for his valuable suggestions, and to Elizabeth Church and James E. Bierly for their
research assistance.
I. Recent voluntary manslaughter cases decided in New Mexico include: State v. Martinez, 95
N.M. 421, 622 P.2d 1041 (1981); State v. Maestas, 95 N.M. 335, 622 P.2d 240 (1981); State v.
Garcia, 95 N.M. 260, 620 P.2d 1285 (1980); State v. Farris, 95 N.M. 96, 619 P.2d 541 (1980);
State v. Benavidez, 94 N.M. 706, 616 P.2d 419 (1980); State v. Robinson, 94 N.M. 693, 616 P.2d
406 (1980); State v. Lujan, 94 N.M. 232, 608 P.2d 1114 (1980); State v. Melendez, 20 N.M. St.
B. Bull. 387 (Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1981); State v. Montano, 95 N.M. 233, 620 P.2d 887 (Ct. App.
1980).
2. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§30-2-1 (Supp. 1981). Until 1980, voluntary manslaughter was statutorily distinguished from murder by the absence of malice. With malice as the dividing line between
murder and manslaughter, the relationship between the two degrees of homicide was clear. The
presence of malice established murder, and the absence of malice meant that manslaughter was the
highest degree of homicide that could be committed. In 1980, the concept of malice was eliminated
from the definition of murder, but the requirement of absence of malice was retained in the definition
of manslaughter. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-1(A) (Supp. 1980) and compare N.M. Stat. Ann. § 302-3(A) (1978). However, the 1980 amendments also repealed § 30-2-2, the provision that defined
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depending upon the felony degree. Murder in the first degree is a capital
felony;3 murder in the second degree is a second degree felony;' voluntary
manslaughter is a third degree felony;5 involuntary manslaughter is a
fourth degree felony.6
The distinguishing mark of the crime of voluntary manslaughter is that
the homicide be "committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of
passion." 7 The New Mexico courts and the Uniform Jury Instructionsmalice. 1980 N.M. Laws ch. 21 § 2. The elimination of the statutory definition of malice renders
the first sentence of the manslaughter statute a meaningless vestige of the repealed New Mexico
homicide law. That sentence reads: "Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-3 (1978). The relationship between murder and manslaughter no
longer turns on the presence or absence of malice. The distinction between them must now be
determined by reference to the different statutory elements that each offense requires.
It is not clear why the New Mexico legislature retained the now meaningless concept of malice
in the definition of manslaughter after abolishing malice as a requirement for murder. The retention
of "without malice" in the definition of manslaughter may have been a legislative oversight. The
omission of the concept of malice in the murder statute may have been an attempt to bring the
murder statute into line with the Uniform Jury Instructions on murder. The instructions do not include
the word "malice." The Committee Commentary offers the following explanation for the elimination
of "malice" in the second-degree murder instruction:
The jurors are not aided by being told that they must find. . . malice aforethought.
Indeed, those terms then have to be defined at great length. Consequently, those
terms, and such definitions as "implied malice," are eliminated and the concepts
incorporated within the phrase "intent to kill or do great bodily harm."
N.M. U.J.I. Crim., Approved Committee Commentaries 2.10 (1978).
The effect of the amendments on the law of voluntary manslaughter has not yet been felt, but
may present some problems. For example, the mitigation from first-degree murder to voluntary
manslaughter was clear under the version of the statute prior to the 1980 amendments. Because
malice was an element of first and second degree murder, the existence of adequate provocation for
voluntary manslaughter negated implied malice as defined in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-2(B) (1978)
[(repealed 1980). N.M. Laws Ch. 21 § 2.] This result is not quite as clear after the 1980 amendments.
Evidence of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion may be relevant to negate a willful, deliberate, or
premeditated killing, but such evidence may be irrelevant to the other types of first degree murder,
which are felony murder and the depraved mind murder. Therefore, in cases such as these, it may
not be possible to reduce first degree murder to voluntary manslaughter. Only the lesser included
offense relationship between murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree permits the
conclusion that sufficient provocation, sudden quarrel, or heat of passion will reduce all first degree
murder charges to voluntary manslaughter. See infra note 16.
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-1(A) (Supp. 1981). The penalty for a capital felony is life imprisonment
or death. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-14 (Repl. Pamp. 1981). See other provisions concerning procedures for imposing the death penalty, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-20(A)-I to 31-20(A)-6 (Repl. Pamp.
1981).
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-1(B) (Supp. 1981). The basic sentence for a second degree felony is
nine years' imprisonment and a maximum fine of $10,000. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-15 (Repl. Pamp.
1981). See, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§31-18-15.1 to 31-18-20 (Repl. Pamp. 1981) for the statutory
provisions which authorize alteration of the basic sentence.
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-3(A) (1978). The basic sentence for a third degree felony is three
years' imprisonment and a maximum fine of $5,000. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-15 (Repl. Pamp.
1981).
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-3(B) (1978). The basic sentence for a fourth degree felony is eighteen
months' imprisonment and a maximum fine of $5,000. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-15 (Repl. Pamp.
1981).
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-2-3(A) (1978). See, e.g., Smith v. State, 89 N.M. 770, 558 P.2d 39
(1976); State v. Trujillo, 27 N.M. 594, 203 P. 846 (1921); State v. Castro, 92 N.M. 585, 592 P.2d
185 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 621, 593 P.2d 62 (1979).
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Criminal (hereinafter U.J.I.) have construed the statutory definition of
voluntary manslaughter to require three elements. First, there must be
provocation which would be sufficient to affect the ability to reason and
to cause a temporary loss of self-control in an ordinary person of average
disposition. 8 Second, the killing must be committed while the accused is
in fact in a state of fear, anger, rage, sudden resentment, terror or other
extreme emotions produced by this sufficient provocation.' Third, the
killing must occur before the emotions subside and self-control and reason
return to an ordinary reasonable person. "
These elements qualify the "heat of passion" language in the statute
by imposing the objective standard of the reasonable person.II The fact
that the defendant killed in the heat of passion or while in a state of
extreme emotional stress is not, by itself, enough to mitigate a murder
charge. The cause of the defendant's emotions must be sufficient to arouse
similar emotions in the reasonable person. 2 The provocation need not,
however, be so strong as to cause the reasonable person to kill. It is
well settled that the reasonable person, regardless of the provocation or
the degree of passion aroused, would not kill except in self-defense.' 3
8. N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 2.22 (Supp. 1981); also see State v. Nevares, 36 N.M. 41, 7 P.2d 933
(1932).
Opinion
,
P.2d
-(Memorandum
N.M.
9. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, ---___
_ ..
P.2d
-(Sup.
N.M.
Ct. App. Docket No. 5044, 1981), cert. granted, Ct. Docket No. 13894, 1981). The provocation formula is the only way affirmatively to establish
voluntary manslaughter in New Mexico. The courts have rejected attempts to permit intoxication or
mental disease or defect to reduce a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter in New
Mexico. See, e.g., State v. Chambers, 84 N.M. 309, 502 P.2d 999 (1972); State v. Tapia, 81 N.M.
274, 466 P.2d 551 (1970). Compare, the California doctrine of diminished capacity which permits
intoxication or a mental disease to mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter. See, e.g., People v.
Conley, 64 Cal.2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966); People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal.2d 716,
336 P.2d 492 (1959).
10. See, N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.20 (Supp. 1981) and Approved Committee Commentaries. See,
e.g., Smith v. State, 89 N.M. 770, 558 P.2d 39 (1976); State v. Trujillo, 27 N.M. 594, 203 P. 846
(1921).
11. Heat of passion by itself may be sufficiently mitigating because a heat of passion killing is
less culpable than is a killing without it. Several states have, on that theory, dispensed with the
requirement that the provocation which results in emotional disturbance of the defendant be reasonable. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2551 (1964); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §630:2 (1974
& Supp. 1979). The Model Penal Code, however, has retained the "reasonable" requirement: "The
reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shal (sic) be determined from the viewpoint of a person
in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be." Model Penal Code
§210.3(1)(b) (Part II, Vol. 1, 1980).
12. The ordinary person of average disposition will not be invested with the mental characteristics
of the defendant which make him particularly susceptible to excitement, anger, or passion. State v.
Nevares, 36 N.M. 41, 7 P.2d 933 (1932). No New Mexico court has considered whether the ordinary
person may be invested with the physical characteristics of the defendant, if the characteristic played
some part in the provocation. See, e.g., Regina v. Ramsey, 29 Crim. App. 14 (1942), where the
court of appeals held that the trial judge erred in failing to call the jury's attention to the fact that
the defendant had but one leg and that the deceased knocked away one of the defendant's crutches
before the defendant stabbed the deceased. Compare, Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft
(1962) § 210.3, which provides that the adequacy of provocation "shall be determined from the
viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be."
13. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 573 (1972).
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Therefore, only the emotion need be reasonable, not the act of killing.' 4
The reasonable person standard is objective. In effect, the standard recognizes that humans sometimes yield to extreme emotions, that such
emotions can lead to killings, and that such killings deserve lesser punishment.'
The crime of voluntary manslaughter is unique in that it may be presented in two fundamentally different ways. In addition to being a separate
crime, a claim of voluntary manslaughter can be a mitigating defense to
murder.' 6 Evidence required to prove "heat of passion" as an element of
a separate crime may be more than is necessary to prove mitigation of a
murder charge. Thus it is important in weighing the evidence in a particular case to know whether voluntary manslaughter is charged as a
separate offense, or raised as a defense. This dual role is the source of
conflict in the theory behind voluntary manslaughter which presents troublesome problems for the courts. These alternatives must also be considered in the effort to set a general evidentiary standard.
Practical problems with the voluntary manslaughter charge reflect the
problems of theory. Voluntary manslaughter is perhaps most often raised
as a mitigating defense, because it offers a middle ground between murder
and total exculpation for intentional homicides. An incentive exists, there14. Unlike self-defense, which requires that the act of killing be reasonable under the circumstances, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-7(A) and (B) (1978) and N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.41 (1978), voluntary
manslaughter only requires that the emotional response, rather than the act of killing, be reasonable.
See also, the discussion of the relationship between self-defense and voluntary manslaughter accompanying notes 73 to 99, infra.
15. See Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide H1,37 Colum. L. Rev. 1261,
1281-82 (1937).
16. When the elements of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion are established, an intentional
killing is reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter, a crime which carries a lesser penalty.
The definition of second degree murder makes it clear how the crime of voluntary manslaughter can
be raised as a defense. The second degree murder provision begins with the proviso that "[U]nless
he is acting upon sufficient provocation, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, a person
who kills another human being without lawful justification or excuse commits murder in the second
degree.
... N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-1(B) (Supp. 1981).
There is no such explicit exemption of heat of passion homicides from murder in the first degree.
Mitigation from murder in the first degree may be inferred, however, from the statutory language
which describes murder in the second degree as a lesser included offense of murder in the first
degree. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-1(B) (Supp. 1981). A lesser included offense is necessarily committed
during commission of the greater offense. State v. Medina, 87 N.M. 394, 534 P.2d 486 (Ct. App.
1975); N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 50.01 (1978 & Supp. 1981). Therefore, a successful defense to second
degree murder would preclude a conviction of first degree murder. If the accused pleads that adequate
provocation aroused extreme emotions and this prevents a second degree murder conviction, presumably the same evidence will also provide a defense to first degree murder. This evidence, however,
will not exculpate, but rather will mitigate the degree of the crime to voluntary manslaughter.
A defendant may also be convicted of voluntary manslaughter in a prosecution in which the highest
degree of homicide charged is voluntary manslaughter. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, ..-- N.M. -,
P.2d
- (Memorandum Opinion Ct. App. Docket No. 5044, 1981), cert. granted,
N.M.
,
P.2d
- (Sup. Ct. Docket No. 13894, 1981). Voluntary manslaughter is
defined with reference to the same words as are used in the definition of second degree murder,
"upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-3(A) (1978).
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fore, to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction in murder prosecutions. Such an instruction gives the jury the option of convicting of a
lower degree of homicide rather than choosing between murder and acquittal. Both the prosecutor and the defense counsel, in the context of a
particular case, may wish to offer this option to the jury, depending on
their assessments of the strengths of the state's case and the strengths of
exculpatory defenses. For example, if the defense counsel believes that,
given the choice between a murder conviction and a self-defense acquittal,
the jury is likely to choose murder, he may request the instruction on
voluntary manslaughter and hope to induce a compromise verdict. In this
example, the prosecutor would be likely to oppose such an instruction,
preferring to have the jury choose only between conviction for murder
and acquittal. In other cases, the prosecutor may request the voluntary
manslaughter charge. 7
The issue of whether a voluntary manslaughter instruction is required
in a murder case can arise on appeal in four different contexts. The
question first arises where neither party has requested a voluntary manslaughter instruction and the defense does not object to the failure to
instruct on manslaughter. The defendant is convicted of murder and appeals on the ground that the evidence required such an instruction. 8 A
second context for the issue occurs when the trial court, on its own,
charges the jury on voluntary manslaughter and the defense does not
object. The defendant is convicted of voluntary manslaughter and appeals
on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.19
A third context occurs when the defense requests a manslaughter charge,
but the trial court denies it. The defendant is convicted of murder and
appeals on the ground that the failure to so instruct was error. 20 The
17. If a prosecutor thinks that the claim of self-defense may prevail, he may request a voluntary
manslaughter instruction predicated on a provocation of fear. This would avoid a complete acquittal.
18. See State v. Najar, 94 N.M. 193, 608 P.2d 169 (Ct. App. 1980). Although defense counsel
informed the trial court that the defense did not desire an instruction on voluntary manslaughter,
appellate counsel for the accused claimed that the failure to instruct was jurisdictional error. The
court of appeals rejected the appeal and affirmed the murder conviction on the ground that Rule 41
(d) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a request for instructions on lesser degrees or lesser
included offenses. The failure to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction in a murder prosecution
therefore prevented a claim of error on appeal.
19. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 89 N.M. 770, 558 P.2d 39 (1976), where the supreme court reviewed
the voluntary manslaughter conviction although "the defense made no objection to the giving of
such an instruction at the trial." Id. at 775, 558 P.2d at 44. See also, State v. Lopez, 79 N.M. 282,
442 P.2d 594 (1968) where the court indicated that the failure to object to a manslaughter instruction
might constitute a waiver of the right to review a manslaughterconviction. The court did not decide
the case on the waiver issue, however, because it found sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
The court in Smith did not mention the waiver issue in reviewing and reversing the defendant's
conviction.
20. Each of the cases cited in note 1, supra, arose in this context. For other cases arising in this
context, see State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979); Smith v. State, 89 N.M. 770, 558
P.2d 39 (1976); State v. Lopez, 79 N.M. 282, 442 P.2d 594 (1968); State v. Trujillo, 27 N.M. 594,
203 P. 846 (1921); State v. Castro, 92 N.M. 585, 592 P.2d 185 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M.
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question can arise in a fourth instance when the defense requests an
instruction on manslaughter and the trial judge gives the instruction. The
defendant is convicted of voluntary manslaughter and appeals,
claiming
21
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict.
Each of these situations is a variation on the question of when an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter is required or merited. The evidence of provocation and heat of passion sufficient to require or merit an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter in New Mexico is not clear. Certainly the absence of any evidence of this nature will make such an
instruction improper.2 2 If some evidence exists, however, two questions
arise. The first is what is the test for measuring the sufficiency of the
evidence to decide whether an instruction is mandated. The second is
what evidence meets the test which is adopted. The first question can be
answered only by discussing the theory behind the charge of voluntary
manslaughter. The second is concerned with how this theory is expressed
in practice.
III. THEORY BEHIND THE USE OF THE VOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER PLEA
The dual role of manslaughter in the New Mexico homicide scheme
has resulted in two different and inconsistent standards for measuring the
evidence required for a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Looking at
voluntary manslaughter primarily as a separate criminal offense, New
Mexico courts have required that the evidence of heat of passion and
provocation be sufficient to support a conviction in order to warrant a
manslaughter instruction. The U.J.I., on the other hand, view manslaughter more as a defense to murder. Accordingly, the U.J.L. require
that the evidence need only raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant
acted in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation before an instruction on manslaughter is required. This conflict in the theory behind the
charge of voluntary manslaughter must be cured before the courts can
develop a general evidentiary standard.
621, 593 P.2d 62 (1979). For cases which affirmed murder convictions after rejecting claims that
manslaughter instructions were warranted by the evidence, see, e.g., State v. Martinez, 95 N.M.
421, 622 P.2d 1041 (1981); State v. Farris, 95 N.M. 96, 619 P.2d 541 (1980); State v. Garcia, 95
N.M. 260, 620 P.2d 1285 (1980); State v. Robinson, 94 N.M. 693, 616 P.2d 406 (1980); State v.
Lujan, 94 N.M. 232, 608 P.2d 1114 (1980) and State v. Nevares, 36 N.M. 41, 7 P.2d 933 (1932).
21. The appellant in State v. Modesto Martinez, Ct. App. Docket No. 5105, has made such a
claim in a case presently before the New Mexico Court of Appeals. See also, Territory v. Trapp,
16 N.M. 700, 120 P. 702 (1911), where the court stated that if the trial court had erred in giving
an instruction requested by the defendant, the error "was invited by appellant, and he cannot be
heard to complain here." Id. at 705, 120 P. at 704. The court held, however, that there was no error
in submitting the voluntary manslaughter instruction to the jury.
22. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 89 N.M. 770, 777, 558 P.2d 39, 46 (1976) and State v. Trujillo,
27 N.M. 594, 603, 203 P. 846, 849 (1921) in which voluntary manslaughter convictions were
reversed because there was no evidence to support such a charge.
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A. The Judicial Standard
New Mexico cases have adopted the standard of "evidence sufficient
to support a conviction." 23 The genesis of this standard was State v.
Trujillo,24 a 1921 case. The court in State v. Lopez 25 relied on Trujillo,
and explicitly set forth the standard in the following terms:
We fully recognize the rule to be as argued by appellant and as stated
in State v. Trujillo, 27 N.M. 594, 203 P. 846 (1921), that it is error
for the court to submit to the jury an issue of whether defendant was
guilty of voluntary manslaughter when the facts establish either first
or second degree murder, but could not support a conviction of
voluntary manslaughter and, accordingly, upon acquittal of murder
and conviction of voluntary manslaughter, a reversal and discharge
of the accused is required.26
In 1976 the court in Smith v. State27 re-examined the Trujillo rule. All
three courts refused to permit voluntary manslaughter to be used as a
defense to murder where it could not also be established as a separate
crime.
In Smith, the defendant was tried for a particularly egregious murder.
At trial, the judge instructed the jury that it could find the defendant
guilty of first degree murder, second degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter. The defendant did not object to the voluntary manslaughter
instruction. The jury acquitted the defendant on the murder charges but
convicted him of voluntary manslaughter. No evidence of provocation,
heat of passion, or sudden quarrel was produced. Sufficient evidence to
convict existed on both degrees of murder. The New Mexico Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction on the ground that provocation is not an
element of voluntary manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter is a lesser
included offense of murder.28 According to the court of appeals, the
absence of any evidence of provocation did not preclude a voluntary
manslaughter instruction or a conviction of voluntary manslaughter.
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and set
aside the voluntary manslaughter conviction. 9 The court observed that
the legislature defined voluntary manslaughter to include the elements of
provocation and heat of passion, elements which are not part of murder.
23. See cases cited supra note 1.
24. 27 N.M. 594, 602, 203 P. 846, 849 (1921). The Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed a
voluntary manslaughter conviction where there was no evidence to support the conviction, although
there was evidence sufficient to support the murder charge.
25. 79 N.M. 282, 442 P.2d 594 (1968).
26. 79 N.M. at 286, 442 P.2d at 598. This language was quoted approvingly in Smith v. State,
89 N.M. 770, 775, 558 P.2d 39, 44 (Ct. App. 1976).
27. 89 N.M. 770, 773, 558 P.2d 39, 42 (1976).
28. State v. Smith, 89 N.M. 777, 558 P.2d 46 (Ct. App. 1976).
29. Smith v. State, 89 N.M. 770, 558 P.2d 39 (1976).
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After setting forth the statutory definition of voluntary manslaughter, the
supreme court ruled: "There must be some evidence that the killing was
committed 'upon a sudden quarrel' or in the 'heat of passion' in order
for a conviction of voluntary manslaughter to stand; so much is clearly
required by our statute." 30 Relying on Trujillo to hold that the trial court
erred in instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter contrary to the
evidence, 3 the court reversed the conviction and discharged the defendant. The offenses of murder and voluntary manslaughter are thus distinct
and require proof of different elements.
In Smith, the supreme court did not indicate exactly how much evidence
of provocation would be necessary to support a conviction of voluntary
manslaughter. The court ruled only that the evidence in that case was
not sufficient. The court did not need to address that question because
the transcript showed no such evidence in Smith. 32 After Smith, assuming
that there is some evidence of provocation, the traditional test for assessing
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction would probably
apply. That test requires that the evidence be sufficient to support a verdict
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 33
By requiring enough evidence to support a voluntary manslaughter
conviction before a defendant can be convicted, Smith and Trujillo set
the standard for trial courts to use in deciding whether a voluntary manslaughter instruction is proper in a murder case. This standard seems too
stringent when considering voluntary manslaughter in its other functionas a mitigating defense. Further, the standard places the defendant in the
peculiar position of having to prove his defense beyond a reasonable
doubt,34 making voluntary manslaughter as a defense to murder unique.
Evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt35 warrants an instruction
on any other defense in New Mexico. For example, a defendant is entitled
30. Id. at 774, 558 P.2d at 43 (1976).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 772, 558 P.2d at 41.
33. The reasoning behind this traditional test also supports the Smith analysis. A conviction for
a crime which the evidence does not show was committed violates due process, and such a conviction
is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970); Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362
U.S. 199 (1960).
34. See State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 101, 597 P.2d 280, 286 (1979). (Where the defendant
requested the instruction and was held to have a burden of producing sufficient evidence to warrant
the instruction). When the prosecutor requests the instruction on voluntary manslaughter, presumably
the burden would fall on the prosecutor. The burden of proving voluntary manslaughter, as opposed
to the burden of producing evidence to get the instruction, always rests with the prosecution. The
burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.20 and 2.21. (Supp. 1981).
35. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), requires, as a matter of due process, proof of each
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See also, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
Any evidence which puts an essential element in doubt would therefore require an instruction on a
defense. Examples of defenses which negate specific elements of intent in New Mexico are the
defenses of intoxication, N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.11 (1978) and mistake of fact, N.M. U.J.I. Crim.
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to the instruction on intoxication whenever he produces evidence which
would raise a reasonable doubt as to his sobriety when he committed the
act.36 He need not prove his drunkenness, merely raise a doubt as to
whether he was sober. Under the Smith-Trujillo test, by contrast, a defendant charged with murder must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he acted in the heat of passion in order to use voluntary manslaughter as
a defense to murder.
Using the Smith-Trujillo test to decide when the evidence requires a
voluntary manslaughter instruction produces other unfortunate results.
First, an accused charged with murder but convicted of voluntary manslaughter goes free if the evidence of an intentional killing would support
a murder conviction but fails to support a voluntary manslaughter conviction. 37 The court of appeals in State v. Melendez" stated: "[tihe necessity of discharging from further proceedings defendants who should
have been convicted for first or second degree murder, is a soul-wrenching
and mind-searing repugnancy in the law." 39 Freeing a possible murderer
is an excessive price to pay to remedy the error of an incorrect instruction
where the trial court endeavors to make voluntary manslaughter a mitigating defense as well as a separate crime.
Second, the possibility that a voluntary manslaughter conviction would
be reversed when voluntary manslaughter instructions are given may
create an incentive in trial judges to refuse requests for voluntary man41.15 (1978). Once there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of
the required intent, the court must give an instruction on the defense.
Defenses which do not negate an element of the offense are called affirmative defenses because
the elements of the defense justify the crime. In New Mexico all defenses, including affirmative
defenses, must be overcome by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., the defense of entrapment,
N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.35 (1978), and the defense of habitation, N.M. U.JI.. Crim. 41.40 (1978).
There is, however, no constitutional prohibition to shifting the burden of proving the elements of
the defense to the defendant. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), where the
New York law placed on the defendant the burden of establishing the affirmative defense of extreme
emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence in a murder prosecution. See also, Leland
v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) where the United States Supreme Court upheld Oregon's procedure
by which the defendant had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt his defense of insanity.
36. N.M. U.JI.. Crim. 41.11 (1978).
37. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 89 N.M. 770, 558 P.2d 39 (1976); State v. Trujillo, 27 N.M. 594,
203 P. 846 (1921); State v. Melendez, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 387 (Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1981); State
v. Castro, 92 N.M. 585, 592 P.2d 185 (Ct. App.) cert denied, 92 N.M. 621, 593 P.2d 62 (1979).
The facts in Smith v. State, 89 N.M. 770, 558 P.2d 39 (1976) vividly demonstrate the cost of the
Smith-Trujillo test. In Smith, the defendants had, or attempted to have sexual intercourse with the
victim, wrapped the victim with a chain and played tug of war with the chain, struck the victim
with a pipe, and threw her in an oil tank, where she drowned. The jury acquitted the defendants of
murder. Id. at 771-72, 558 P.2d at 40-41. Because the record was devoid of any evidence of
sufficient provocation, the supreme court reversed, stating that under the circumstances, the manslaughter instruction was erroneous. Id. at 778, 558 P.2d at 46.
38. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 387 (Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1981). [Ed. note: After this article was written,
but before final publication, this case was reversed by the New Mexico Supreme Court. 97 N.M.
738, 643 P.2d 607 (1982).
39. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 391.
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slaughter instructions. Almost all of the cases addressed in this article
came to the appellate courts on claims of erroneous denials of manslaughter charges. Trial judges may reasonably assume that the risk of
discharging a guilty defendant dictates a course of action which precludes
a voluntary manslaughter instruction at the trial level and leaves the issue
to the appellate court. Only if the appellate court reverses and remands
for a new trial on voluntary manslaughter will the trial court feel safe in
instructing the jury on manslaughter. The delays and use of appellate
resources to obtain what is in effect a declaratory judgment are part of
the costs attending the Smith-Trujillo test. Appellate courts may be reluctant to reverse murder convictions which are supported by sufficient
evidence where the evidence also supports a manslaughter charge, and
the jury was denied the opportunity to choose between the two.' °
The most important cost of the Smith-Trujillo test, however, is the loss
in many cases of the mitigating defense function to the defendant who
killed in the heat of passion. This test effectively denies one of the
important aspects of voluntary manslaughter-reducing the degree of a
homicide to reflect lesser culpability because killing occurred in the heat
of passion upon adequate provocation.
B. The U.J.I. Approach
The U.J.I. tries to allow voluntary manslaughter to serve as a defense
to murder as well as a separate crime. Recognizing that voluntary manslaughter can be a defense as well as a criminal offense, the U.J.I. includes
two separate instructions on voluntary manslaughter. Uniform Jury Instruction 2.20 sets forth the elements of manslaughter when it serves as
a mitigating defense to murder. Uniform Jury Instruction 2.21 describes
the elements essential for conviction when manslaughter is the highest
degree of homicide charged. Only the latter instruction requires proof of
sufficient provocation beyond a reasonable doubt of conviction of voluntary manslaughter. The existence of the two instructions reflects the
U.J.I. solution to the apparent conflict between the two functions of the
crime of voluntary manslaughter.
The U.J.I. were amended in 1981. The old U.J.I. (voluntary manslaughter as a defense in a murder prosecution) provided: "If you find
that the defendant acted as a result of sufficient provocation or if you
have a reasonable doubt as to whether he so acted, you must find him
not guilty of second degree murder, and you should proceed to consider
whether he is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 4 ' This instruction, which
40. See, e.g., State v. Farris, 95 N.M. 96, 619 P.2d 541 (1980).
41. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.20 (1978). This instruction is for manslaughter as a lesser included
offense.
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was in effect until September, 1981, emphasized the defense aspect of
voluntary manslaughter. It omitted heat of passion, sudden quarrel, or
sufficient provocation which are elements of voluntary manslaughter as
a separate crime. Without these affirmative elements, voluntary manslaughter could be more readily used as a defense.
The amended version of the U.J.I. does not change the instructions'
emphasis on the mitigating defense aspect of voluntary manslaughter in
murder prosecutions. Uniform Jury Instruction 2.20 still does not require
proof of provocation for conviction of voluntary manslaughter. 42 Furthermore, the jury is told in another instruction, the 1981 version of U.J.I.
2.10, that the state, in order to convict on a second degree murder charge,
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act as
a result of sufficient provocation. 43 Therefore, evidence raising a reasonable doubt on the issue of provocation and heat of passion will permit
provocation to operate as a defense to murder.
42. The 1981 version of 2.20 is substantially different from that approved in 1978. The 1981
instruction provides in its entirety:
For you to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the state must
prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following ele(name of victim);
ments of the crime: 1. The defendant killed
2. The defendant knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great
(name of victim or any other human being);
bodily harm to
, 19-.
day of __
3. This happened in New Mexico on or about
The difference between second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter is
sufficient provocation. In second degree murder the defendant kills without having
been sufficiently provoked, that is, without sufficient provocation. In the case of
voluntary manslaughter the defendant kills after having been sufficiently provoked,
that is, as a result of sufficient provocation. Sufficient provocation reduces second
degree murder to voluntary manslaughter.
N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.20 (Supp. 1981).
The new version of the voluntary manslaughter instruction omitted the language regarding the
jury's reasonable doubt as quoted supra in the text accompanying note 41. The 1981 version of
2.20 added "sufficient" to modify provocation in describing the difference between second degree
murder and voluntary manslaughter. The new version deleted the final paragraph of the 1978 instruction, which read:
Sufficient provocation can be any action, conduct or circumstances which arouse
anger, rage, fear, sudden resentment, terror or other extreme emotions. The provocation must be such as would affect the ability to reason and cause a temporary
loss of self control in an ordinary person of average disposition. The provocation
must be such that an ordinary person would not have cooled off before acting.
N.M. U.J.i. Crim. 2.20 (1978). This final passage is now included in N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.22
(Supp. 1981), as a separate definition. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.20 (Supp. 1981). In sum, the version
of 2.20 is changed in three ways: First, it eliminates a reference to the defense aspect of voluntary
manslaughter. Second, it eliminates the definition of sufficient provocation, now found in N.M.
U.J.I. Crim. 2.22 (Supp. 1981). Third, "intent" is absent in the 1981 version of 2.20. N.M. U.JI.
Crim. 2.20 (1978) had provided that the state must prove, as an element of voluntary manslaughter,
that "[tlhe defendant had an intent to kill or do great bodily harm to [the victim or any other human
being]."
43. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.10 (Supp. 1981).
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In treating provocation as a defense rather than an element of a separate
offense, U.J.I. 2. 10 and 2.20 set forth a logical standard for measuring
the evidence which will merit an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
That standard, however, is inconsistent with the standard adopted by the
New Mexico appellate courts. In order to warrant U.J.I. instruction 2.20,
evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt is all that is required. In
contrast, the New Mexico courts require evidence sufficient to convict
as a prerequisite for the instruction. Uniform Jury Instruction 2.20 eliminated provocation as an element for conviction of voluntary manslaughter
when murder is charged. By eliminating provocation, U.J.I. 2.20 virtually
rewrote the voluntary manslaughter statute by permitting conviction44 without proof of the heat of passion which is specified in the statute.
A second instruction, which embodies the function of the voluntary
manslaughter charge as a separate offense, however, does acknowledge
the statutory requirement of provocation. When murder is not charged,
U.J.I. 2.21 on voluntary manslaughter includes a requirement that "the
defendant acted as a result of sufficient provocation." 4 5 This element was
added to U.J.I. 2.21 in 1981 .46 The instruction, unlike U.J.I. 2.20, reflects
the statutory requirement of heat of passion."
The U.J.I. scheme of including two different instructions for voluntary
manslaughter attempts to resolve the conflicting functions of voluntary
manslaughter. When murder is charged and voluntary manslaughter is
serving both as a mitigating defense and a separate offense, U.J.1. 2.20
provides that a conviction for voluntary manslaughter need not require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted as a result of
sufficient provocation when the defendant is charged solely with the
offense of voluntary manslaughter however, U.J.I. 2.21 then requires
proof of the provocation element beyond a reasonable doubt.
44. Neither provocation nor heat of passion are included as elements in the 1981 amendment to
N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.20, just as they were not in the previous formulation. The elements of manslaughter in the 1978 version of N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.20 (1978), were (1)the defendant killed...;
(2) the defendant had an intent to kill or do great bodily harm ... ; and (3) this happened in New
Mexico.
45. It is only in N.M. U.J.I. 2.21 (Supp. 1981), the voluntary manslaughter instruction to be
used when murder' is not charged and when voluntary manslaughter is not used as a mitigating
defense, that proof of provocation is required for conviction. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.21 (Supp. 1981).
The 1981 version of 2.21 includes the element of the defendant's acting "as a result of sufficient
provocation," where as the 1978 version of 2.21 did not contain this element.
46. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.21 (Supp. 1981).
47. The previous version of U.J.I. 2.21 (1978) did not include provocation as an element of
N.M. -.
P.2d voluntary manslaughter. See note 45, supra. In State v. Morgan,
,P.2d
N.M.
(Memorandum Opinion, Ct. App. Docket No. 5044, 1981) cert. granted,(Sup. Ct. Docket No. 13890, 1981) the defendant, convicted of voluntary manslaughter under
the previous version of U.J.I. 2.21, appealed his conviction on the ground that a voluntary manslaughter conviction cannot stand where there is no instruction by the court or finding by the jury
that the defendant acted as a result of adequate provocation. The court of appeals affirmed the
opinion, and the Supreme Court of New Mexico agreed to review the conviction.
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This solution can be criticized as inconsistent with statutory and judicial
law in New Mexico. The two jury instructions provide for both roles of
voluntary manslaughter. The statutory definition of voluntary manslaughter, however, does not include two different versions.4" Further, as pointed
out above, 49 New Mexico case law dictates a different solution. The
Smith-Trujillo test does not recognize that the statute creates two different
types of voluntary manslaughter. Instead, the test reconciles the possible
conflict in the dual role of voluntary manslaughter by requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of heat of passion upon adequate provocation
for both conviction of voluntary manslaughter and mitigation from murder. In other words, New Mexico case law does not permit evidence of
provocation, which may raise a reasonable doubt as to murder but which
is insufficient to convict of voluntary manslaughter, to function as a
mitigating defense.
To justify the departure from New Mexico law, the writers of the
instructions looked to constitutional law. In according significance to the
defense aspect of voluntary manslaughter, the drafters of the U.J.I. relied
on the United States Supreme Court opinion of Mullaney v. Wilbur.5 In
Mullaney, a murder prosecution in Maine, the trial court instructed the
jury that the defendant had the burden of proving by a preponderance of
evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in
order to negate malice and reduce the homicide from murder to voluntary
manslaughter. The United States Supreme Court held that due process
"requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence
of the heat of passion on sudden provocation. . . " to convict of murder.'
The relationship between murder and voluntary manslaughter in Maine
was critical to the Court; the two homicides represented different degrees
of culpability on the basis of the presence or absence of heat of passion.
The Court considered absence of heat of passion to be an essential element
of malice, and, therefore, an essential element of murder. Thus, the Court
held that, under In re Winship,52 which requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt as to every element of a crime, the prosecution had to prove the
absence of heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the New Mexico murder statute, the relationship between murder
and voluntary manslaughter is the same as the one that existed in Maine's
48. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-3 (1978).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 22 through 34.
50. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
51. The Court in Mullaney focused on voluntary manslaughter as a defense to murder. The court
did not consider the aspect of voluntary manslaughter as a separate crime. The Court did not address
the question of what evidence is sufficient to support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter as a
separate crime. Mullaney left open the question of whether evidence which only raises a reasonable
doubt as to the existence of heat of passion also permits a voluntary manslaughter conviction beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 704.
52. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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statutory scheme. The elements of voluntary manslaughter establish a
defense to murder."3 This structure, according to Mullaney, requires proof
of the absence of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The U.J.I.
codifies this requirement. For example, consistent with Mullaney, U.J.L.
2.10, the instruction for second degree murder, requires as the third
element that the "defendant did not act as a result of sufficient provocation." 54 This element must be proved by the state beyond a reasonable
doubt.5 5 Uniform Jury Instruction 2.20, the instruction for voluntary manslaughter as a defense in a murder prosecution, repeats the Mullaney
requirement.56 The Mullaney decision, therefore, supports the U.J.I. scheme,
and may require it as a federal constitutional matter, despite state law to
the contrary.
The U.J.1. provides a logical and satisfactory solution to the problem
of the dual role of the voluntary manslaughter plea. The U.J.I. makes
voluntary manslaughter a true lesser included offense of murder. Voluntary manslaughter under this structure would necessarily be committed
whenever murder is committed. The U.J.I. succeeds in avoiding conflicting roles for voluntary manslaughter. Under the U.J.I., voluntary
manslaughter is not a hybrid serving both as a defense to murder and a
separate crime with additional and different elements from murder.5 7 Under the U.J.I., in a murder trial, if evidence of provocation and heat of
passion is sufficient to cause reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury
as to whether the killing was the result of such passion, then the jury
must be instructed on voluntary manslaughter.58 If the jury decides that
53. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Crim. 2.10 (Supp. 1981). The 1978 version of N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.10 (1978)
54. N.M. U.J.I.
is worded much the same as its successor. The only difference between the two is that this third
element, quoted in the text, was previously bracketed and is no longer. The 1978 Use Note stated
that the bracketed third element must be used "ifprovocation is in issue." N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 2.10
(1978).
55. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.10 (Supp. 1981) provides:
For you to find the defendant guilty of second degree murder .. . the state
must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following
elements of the crime: .. . .[that the defendant killed the victim, that the defendant knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm to the victim, that the defendant did not act as a result of sufficient provocation, and that the event took place in New Mexico on a certain date].
56. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.20 (Supp. 1981) includes the following language: "[flor you to find
the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the state must prove to your satisfaction beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime: ...."
57. Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder under the Uniform Jury Instructions because the elements of voluntary manslaughter are also included in the elements of
murder. Thus the U.J.i. has succeeded in eliminating the conflict between voluntary manslaughter
as separate crime and as a defense. Under the statute, however, voluntary manslaughter is a separate
crime because the elements of voluntary manslaughter, such as heat of passion or sudden quarrel,
are not included in the elements of murder. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-3(A) (1978).
58. Neither N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 2.20 (Supp. 1981), the 1978 version, nor the Committee Commentary expressly state that evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt requires voluntary man-
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the killing was committed due to sufficient provocation or that they have
reasonable doubt as to whether it was so committed, the homicide is
reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter.59 The voluntary manslaughter conviction cannot successfully be challenged on the ground of
insufficient evidence, because a killing by a defendant who knew that his
acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm is all that
is required for conviction under the U.J.I. ° No additional requirements
of heat of passion, sudden quarrel or adequate provocation exist under
U.J.I. 2.20.61 Voluntary manslaughter may be brought as a charge or
raised as a defense without contradictory evidence requirements or peculiar results.
IV. CURRENT PRACTICE IN NEW MEXICO LAW
Despite the advantages of the U.J.I. scheme, New Mexico courts continue to accede to the Smith-Trujillo requirement that enough evidence
for an independent conviction of voluntary manslaughter exist before that
plea can be raised as a defense to a murder charge. Some of the difficulties
of this requirement have been discussed above.6 2 On a purely practical
level, the trial court, in order to rule on the propriety of a voluntary
manslaughter instruction, must decide whether evidence is sufficient to
support a conviction. This inquiry has proven troublesome. This article
undertakes an analysis of recent New Mexico cases bearing upon the
question and comments on other aspects of the law related to voluntary
manslaughter in New Mexico, particularly self-defense. The cases demonstrate the need to reconsider how voluntary manslaughter fits, or should
fit, into the current statutory homicide scheme.
slaughter instruction. In fact, the Committee Commentary to N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.20 (Supp. 1981)
states that the test is "evidence sufficient to support a verdict of conviction of manslaughter." The
test of evidence sufficient to support a verdict is inconsistent with the language of N.M. U.J.I. Crim.
2.10, however, and the commentary is unlikely to be followed. If there is evidence sufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt, such evidence, under the instruction, requires an acquittal of murder even
though it may not support a finding of provocation or heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt.
It would make no sense to require evidence sufficient for conviction to get the instruction on voluntary
manslaughter. This is precisely the problem the instruction was intended to resolve. N.M. U.JI.
Crim. 2.10, which concerns second degree murder, and expressly mentions voluntary manslaughter
as a lesser included defense, further supports this reading.
59. This result is suggested by the language of N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.10 and 2.20 (Supp. 1981),
although the Committee Commentary to U.J.I. 2.20, see supra note 58, the statute, and New Mexico
case law require evidence of heat of passion or sudden quarrel upon adequate provocation to sustain
a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. See supra notes 22-34, and accompanying text for a
discussion of the test adopted by the New Mexico courts for judging the sufficiency of the evidence
for a voluntary manslaughter conviction.
60. N.M. U.JI. Crim. 2.20, in the 1978 or 1981 version, does not instruct the jury that they
must find the existence of sudden quarrel or heat of passion in order to convict the defendant of
voluntary manslaughter.
61. See supra note 42.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 34 through 40.
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The recent cases decided by New Mexico appellate courts can be
divided into three broad categories. Six cases involved situations where
the claimed passion was fear.63 Three cases presented situations where
extreme emotional stress was engendered in the context of a confrontation
between the defendant and his former wife or girlfriend. 64 A third group
focused on the legality of the provoking conduct.65 Each category will
be examined separately.
A. Provocation of Fear
The New Mexico appellate courts addressed several issues in reviewing
the six cases in which the defendants claimed fear as the provoked emotion. These issues concern the relevance of the build-up of provocation
over time, the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence of provocation where
the defendant does not testify as to provocation, the relationship between
self-defense and voluntary manslaughter, and the adequacy of provocation
which was induced by the defendant's conduct. These four issues will be
analyzed separately.
1. Build-up of Provocation
In State v. Benavidez,66 the evidence showed that the victim had at one
time stolen a television set belonging to the defendant. The victim had
introduced the defendant's son to heroin and had assaulted the defendant's
son in the past. The victim threatened both the defendant and his son
with death on the afternoon of the shooting. The highly intoxicated victim
came to the defendant's home and engaged the defendant in an argument.
During the argument, the victim made a gesture which could have been
an attempt to strike or move for a weapon. The trial court refused the
defendant's request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The
defendant was convicted of murder. The Supreme Court of New Mexico
held that the evidence met the standard of provocation sufficient to sustain
a conviction of voluntary manslaughter.
In addition to focusing on the events immediately preceding the killing,
the court in Benavidez expressly relied on events in the past as bearing
on the sufficiency of the provocation. The court deemed that the relations
between the victim and the defendant over a period of time were relevant
63. State v. Martinez, 95 N.M. 421, 622 P.2d 1041 (1981); State v. Maestas, 95 N.M. 335, 622
P.2d 240 (1981); State v. Garcia, 95 N.M. 260, 620 P.2d 1285 (1980); State v. Benavidez, 94 N.M.
706, 616 P.2d 419 (1980); State v. Melendez, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 387 (Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1981);
State v. Montano, 95 N.M. 233, 620 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1981).
64. State v. Farris, 95 N.M. 96, 619 P.2d 541 (1980); State v. Robinson, 94 N.M. 693, 616 P.2d
406 (1980); State v. Lujan, 94 N.M. 232, 608 P.2d 1114 (1980).
65. State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979) and State v. Marquez, 96 N.M. 746, 634
P.2d 1298 (1981).
66. 94 N.M. 706, 616 P.2d 419 (1980).

Spnng 19821

VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

to assess the provocation. The court did not indicate, however, in precisely
what way the prior encounters between the victim and the defendant were
relevant. It is difficult to tell how much weight the court gave these factors
and how they would be applied in future cases.
67
decided two months later, the supreme court cast
In State v. Farris,
doubt on the relevance of past events. In Farris,the defendant shot and
killed his estranged wife. There was evidence that the defendant and his
wife of 20 years had separated several times before because of the wife's
alleged boyfriends. During the final separation, the wife's boyfriend and
brother threatened the defendant twice. The defendant bought a gun for
protection. On the day of the shooting he arranged to meet his wife. He
went to the family home and a quarrel ensued. The wife poked the
defendant in the chest and told him to leave her boyfriend alone. She
said that the boyfriend could come to her house any time he wanted. The
defendant "lost his head" and shot her.6" The trial court did not instruct
the jury on manslaughter. The defendant was convicted of first degree
murder.
The court in Farriscited Benavidez and stated that of the circumstances
relied on in Benavidez, the "most important are those within the res
gestae of the killing. For there must be evidence of a sudden quarrel or
heat of passion at the time of the commission of the crime." 69 The court
in Farristhen ignored the prior circumstances which might have provoked
the defendant and decided the adequacy of the provocation on the basis
of the evidence at the time of the killing. The court held that the evidence
at the time of the killing-the wife's talking to the defendant and poking
him in the chest-was not sufficient to show provocation.
By ignoring the prior relationship between Farris and his wife and
considering only the circumstances at the time of the killing, the supreme
court in Farrisdid not give effect to any build-up of provocation over a
period of time. The events immediately preceding the act of killing may
by themselves be insufficient provocation. Considered together with the
prior provocative events, however, those events may unleash emotions
previously held in check. To deny consideration of prior events as evidence of a build-up of provocation is to consider the adequacy of provocation out of context.
Farris and Benavidez appear to be inconsistent in their views of the
significance of acts of provocation prior to the killing. Perhaps a distinction can be found in the relationship of the prior provocations to the
67. 95 N.M. 96, 97, 619 P.2d 541, 542 (1980). This case is included among those concerning
fear for purposes of comparison with Benavidez. Farris is also discussed with those cases involving
non-fear emotions. See infra text accompanying notes 129 through 131.
68. 75 N.M. at 96, 619 P.2d at 541.
69. Id. at 97, 619 P.2d at 542.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

final provoking acts. In Farris, the prior provocations were not fearproducing incidents. In Benavidez, the assault on the defendant's son and
threats to the defendant related to the defendant's fear. These prior acts
may have built up the defendant's fear of the victim so that, at the time
of the killing, the argument and the arm motion of the victim gave rise
to adequate provocation.
One problem with this distinction is that the court in Benavidez did
not limit its consideration of past events to those which might provoke
fear. The court also referred to acts of the victim that aroused other
emotions, such as anger. For example, the victim's actions of theft and
of introducing the son to heroin elicit emotions of a different nature than
do the assault and threats. Another problem with this distinction is that
the prior provocative circumstances in Farris-amarital relationship in
which the defendant's wife allegedly had several boyfriends-are directly
related to the evidence of provocation at the time of killing when the
wife poked the defendant and told him to leave her boyfriend alone.
The only explanation which might serve effectively to distinguish Benavidez from Farris is the nature of the passion aroused. Benavidez
involved some provocation of fear whereas Farrisinvolved the provocation of anger, jealousy, or other extreme emotions typical of marital
and other male-female relationships. This distinction is unsatisfactory,
however, because emotions unleashed in a troubled relationship may cause
just as much of a temporary loss of self-control in an ordinary person of
average disposition as would the emotion of fear or terror. Indeed, both
types of emotions are listed in U.J.I. 2.22.70 Nor is such a distinction
suggested by the statute, which includes both sudden quarrel and heat of
passion.7"
It is important to note that Farrisdid not overrule Benavidez insofar
as Benavidez sanctioned consideration of prior provocative circumstances.
Farrisqualified Benavidez by stating that the most important of the circumstances relevant to provocation are those which exist at the time of
the killing. Farrisis a troublesome case because the court chose to ignore
prior provocation and focused solely on the evidence of provocation at
the time of the killing. The defendant in Farris was no less entitled to
present voluntary manslaughter to the jury as a means of mitigating a
murder charge than was the defendant in Benavidez. Whether the evidence
in either case merited a conviction of voluntary manslaughter rather than
murder should have been a jury question. The court's removal of this
issue from the jury in Farris cannot be justified. It does not solve the
question of what standard of evidence is required to support an instruction
on voluntary manslaughter.
70. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.22 (Supp. 1981).
71. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-2-3(A) (1978).
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2. Proof of Provocation of Fear by CircumstantialEvidence
One case involving fear resulted in reversal of a murder conviction
because the court considered evidence of provocation to be sufficient to
require a voluntary manslaughter instruction. In State v. Maestas,7 2 the
New Mexico Supreme Court had before it only evidence presented by
the state's witnesses. The defense did not produce any evidence. The
state's evidence showed that an argument took place between the defendant and the victim at a bar. Later, the defendant was seated in his
car and the victim, who was intoxicated, left the bar and approached the
car. The victim either staggered or lunged toward the car and then leaned
into the car window. The defendant shot the victim after the victim was
at the car. After the shooting, a knife, similar to a knife owned by the
victim, was found near the victim's body. The trial court gave no voluntary
manslaughter instruction.
On appeal, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Although the court did not
state the reasons for its conclusion, it apparently viewed the evidence as
supporting inferences that the defendant believed that the victim intended
to attack him, feared an attack, and killed as a result of the fear provoked
by the victim's conduct. No evidence was introduced of past provocation
leading up to the argument between the defendant and the victim, and
there was no evidence of any threatening gesture made by the victim
toward the defendant.
In Maestas, the supreme court did not require direct evidence of adequate provocation to merit a voluntary manslaughter instruction. After
Maestas, the fact that the defendant does not testify that he was provoked,
that he feared the victim, and that he killed while in the state of fear will
not defeat a manslaughter defense if circumstantial evidence gives rise
to those inferences.
3. Provocation of Fear and Self-Defense
Another murder case meriting reversal was State v. Montano,7 3decided
by the New Mexico Court of Appeals. The evidence showed no prior
provocative incidents between the defendant, a woman, and the victim,
a man, before the day of the killing. About 8:00 a.m. on the day of the
killing, the victim and a friend went to the defendant's home and drank
beer until 10:00 a.m., when they left to watch a parade. They returned
to the defendant's house until the bars opened early in the afternoon and
returned again around 6:00 p.m., when the friend passed out in the car.
The friend entered the house when he awoke and both men remained in
72. 95 N.M. 335, 622 P.2d 240 (1981).
73. 95 N.M. 233, 620 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1981).
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the defendant's house despite her wishes that they leave. The victim was
hostile, and knocked a hole in a wall when the defendant refused to cook
for him. Near midnight, the friend agreed to leave and take the victim
with him. The victim became angry, looked threateningly at the defendant,
and started to rise from his chair near the kitchen table, where the defendant had left a gun. The defendant explained at trial that the gun was
on the table because she had been threatened by teenagers and she knew
the men were too drunk to defend her. The defendant grabbed the gun
and backed into the kitchen sink. The gun discharged, killing the victim.
The trial judge denied defendant's request for voluntary manslaughter
instruction. She was convicted of murder in the second degree.
The court of appeals examined the evidence and concluded that it
warranted an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.74 The court found
that evidence that the victim became angered, looked threateningly at the
defendant, and started to rise, suggested a sudden quarrel. Furthermore,
the victim's conduct in rising from his chair near the table permitted the
inference that he was making a move for the gun on the table. These
circumstances, in addition to the victim's drinking, his refusal to leave,
and his earlier violent conduct led the court of appeals to hold that a jury
could find that the defendant acted from fear due to sufficient provocation.
The court stated that the fact that the defendant testified that she did not
intend to shoot did not preclude the defense of voluntary manslaughter
because her testimony was not conclusive. The other evidence supported
a conviction of voluntary manslaughter, and the failure to give an instruction on this issue required reversal. 7"
The Montano case follows a line of New Mexico cases which view
voluntary manslaughter as closely related to self-defense where the passion involved is fear. 76 In State v. Lopez," decided in 1968, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico stated that "when facts are present which give rise
to a plea of self-defense, it is not unreasonable that if the plea fails, the
accused should be found guilty of voluntary manslaughter." 78 Under this
reasoning, voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included defense of selfdefense in a murder prosecution. If the jury accepts the argument of self74. Id. at 236, 620 P.2d at 890.
75. The court of appeals in Montano also ruled that the failure to instruct the jury on self-defense
was error. Id. at 235, 620 P.2d at 889. The court found that the evidence that the defendant shot
the victim out of fear of death or great bodily harm was sufficient to permit the inference that she
acted reasonably under the circumstances. The evidence was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt
that she did not act in self-defense and therefore required an instruction on self-defense.
76. See State v. Lopez, 79 N.M. 282, 442 P.2d 594 (1968); State v. Wright, 38 N.M. 427, 34
P.2d 870 (1934); State v. Kidd, 24 N.M. 572, 175 P. 772 (1917); State v. Harrison, 81 N.M. 623,
471 P.2d 193 (Ct. App), cert. denied, 81 N.M. 668, 472 P.2d 382 (1970).
77. 79 N.M. 282, 442 P.2d 594 (1968).
78. Id. at 285, 442 P.2d at 597.
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defense, the defendant is acquitted. If the jury rejects the self-defense
theory, it may choose voluntary manslaughter rather than murder as the
degree of homicide.
The relationship between self-defense and voluntary manslaughter is
based on the emotion of fear. To establish self-defense, the defendant
must show that he feared immediate death or great bodily harm, that he
killed as a result of that fear, and that he acted as a reasonable person
would have acted in the same circumstances.7 9 The same fear of death
or great bodily harm, if caused by sufficient provocation, will establish
voluntary manslaughter.8"
When the defendant's act of killing is "reasonable," self-defense ap-82
plies. 8' The defendant's perception of the danger must be reasonable,
and his act of killing must also be reasonable.8 3 By comparison, voluntary
manslaughter applies where the defendant's fear is provoked by conduct
or circumstances which "would affect the ability to reason and cause a
temporary loss of self-control in an ordinary person of average disposition." 84 Voluntary manslaughter does not require that the defendant's act
of killing be reasonable. This difference accounts for the exculpatory
effect of self-defense as opposed to the mitigating significance of voluntary manslaughter. "Imperfect self-defense," 85 where the defendant's
act of killing is unreasonable, establishes voluntary manslaughter. Selfdefense fails where in the same circumstances, a reasonable person would
not have been in fear of death or great bodily harm. Voluntary manslaughter also fails at this point.
State v. Melendez86 arose in the context of an appeal from a conviction87
of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. This case, like Montano,
involved both claims of self-defense and voluntary manslaughter. There
was evidence that the defendant and friends were shot at twice by someone
in a car owned by man named Tegada. About three hours later that
79. See, N.M. U.J.J. Crim. 41.41 (Supp. 1981). For cases developing the elements of selfdefense, see State v. Parks, 25 N.M. 395, 183 P. 433 (1919); State v. Dickens, 23 N.M. 26, 165
P. 850 (1917); State v. Chesher, 22 N.M. 319, 161 P. 1108 (1916); State v. Vansickel, 20 N.M.
190, 147 P. 457 (1915); Territory v. Baker, 4 N.M. 236, 13 P. 30 (1887).
80. Fear is explicitly listed as one of the emotions which may establish voluntary manslaughter.
N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 2.22 (Supp. 1981).
81. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.41 (Supp. 1981) provides: "3. The apparent danger would have caused
a reasonable person in the same circumstances to act as the defendant did."
82. See, e.g., State v. Dickens, 23 N.M. 26, 165 P. 850 (1917); State v. Chesher, 22 N.M. 319,
161 P. 1108 (1916); State v. Vansickel, 20 N.M. 190, 147 P. 457 (1915).
83. N.M. U.J.I. Crim.41.41 (Supp. 1981); State v. Garcia, 83 N.M. 51, 487 P.2d 1356 (Ct.
App. 1971).
84. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 21.22 (Supp. 1981).
85. This term is used in W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 397 (1972).
86. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 387 (Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1981).
87. State v. Montano, 95 N.M. 233, 620 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1980).
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evening, the defendant and his companions were driving around, saw the
Tegada car and decided to talk to the occupants and tell them to stop
shooting. According to the defendant's testimony, as they were about to
stop near the Tegada car, a door of the car opened and a shot was fired
at the car in which the defendant was a front seat passenger. Fearing he
would be shot, the defendant grabbed a rifle and shot it, killing one of
the occupants of the Tegada car. He had picked up the rifle from his
brother-in-law after the first shooting incident earlier that evening. The
defendant was charged with murder. The trial judge instructed the jury
on both self-defense and voluntary manslaughter. The jury acquitted the
defendant of murder, returned a verdict of guilty on the voluntary manslaughter charge, and rejected the defendant's claim of self-defense.
The court of appeals in Melendez reversed the voluntary manslaughter
conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the
verdict. 88 The court of appeals disregarded the evidence of the shot from
the Tegada car immediately prior to the defendant's shot because of the
jury's rejection of self-defense. The court of appeals assumed that the
jury's verdict meant that it did not believe that the occupants of the Tegada
car fired at the defendant. Stating that the evidence of self-defense was
obliterated by the jury's verdict, the court of appeals considered only the
evidence of the first shooting encounter about three hours before the
defendant killed the victim. Although the court of appeals accepted the
earlier incident as adequate provocation, it decided that the lapse of three
hours was too long a cooling period for the provocation and the heat of
passion to concur.89 The court of appeals thus concluded that the evidence
was insufficient to support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. Under
the Smith-Trujillo test' the court of appeals reversed defendant's conviction and discharged him.
Melendez was decided incorrectly and serves as an example of the
inadequacy of the Smith-Trujillo test. The court's explanation for its
refusal to consider the circumstances immediately prior to the killing is
unsatisfactory. The standard for measuring the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether the evidence would support a verdict of guilty.9 The evidence
in the record included testimony by the defendant that there was a shot
fired from Tegada's car immediately before he shot the victim. The court's
rejection of this evidence on the basis of the jury's rejection of selfdefense forced the court to speculate as to the reasons for the jury's
88. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 387, 391 (Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1981).
89. Id.
90. Smith v. State, 89 N.M. 770, 558 P.2d 39 (1976) and State v. Trujillo, 27 N.M. 594, 203
P. 846 (1921). See supra notes 23-36 for a discussion of this test.
91. Smith v. State, 89 N.M. 770, 558 P.2d 39 (1976); State v. Trujillo, 27 N.M. 594, 203 P.
846 (1921).
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verdict. The jury's verdict could have been based on any of three legitimate grounds under the instructions on self-defense given: (1) the jury
did not believe that the defendant was fired upon; (2) the jury, although
believing that the defendant was fired upon, did not believe that the
defendant reasonably feared death or great bodily harm, perhaps because
the defendant went looking for Tegada's car with a rifle; or (3) the jury,
although believing that the defendant was fired upon and was in fear of
death, believed that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would
not have fired the rifle into the Tegada car but instead would have fled.
It is impossible to ascertain which of the possibilities led to that verdict.
Each of these possibilities would have permitted the jury to reject the
defendant's claim of self-defense.9 2 The latter two are completely consistent with a conviction for voluntary manslaughter. By ignoring two of
the three possible reasons for the jury's rejection of self-defense, the court
of appeals erred in that it failed to look at the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, the reviewing court must draw all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict. 93
The court of appeals in Melendez in effect decided the sufficiency of
the evidence issue by reference to the jury's supposed findings. No New
Mexico court has ever suggested that the jury's verdict, or the findings
which support it, are factors to consider in assessing the sufficiency of
the evidence. Furthermore, consideration of the jury verdict is unworkable. The same standard of evidence sufficient to support a conviction
also determines whether an instruction on voluntary manslaughter is required. The trial judge cannot take into account the jury's verdict before
92. See, N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.41 (Supp. 1981), which provides:
Evidence has been presented that the defendant killed (name of victim) while
defending himself.
If defendant killed (name of victim) in self-defense you must find him not
guilty.
The killing is in self-defense if:
I. There was an appearance of immediate danger of death or great bodily harm
to the defendant as a result of . . . ; and

2. The defendant was in fact put in fear by the apparent danger of immediate
death or great bodily harm and killed (name of victim) because of that fear; and
3. The apparent danger would have caused a reasonable person in the same
circumstances to act as the defendant did.
The burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
did not act in self-defense.
93. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 79 N.M. 282, 442 P.2d 594 (1968); State v. Weber, 76 N.M. 636,
417 P.2d 444 (1966); and State v. Crouch, 75 N.M. 533, 407 P.2d 671 (1965). The court in Lopez
stated that appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence "is limited to a determination of
whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence when viewed in a light most favorable to
the State, and with all permissible inferences indulged in support of the verdict." 79 N.M. at 283,
442 P.2d at 595.
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deciding whether to give the voluntary manslaughter charge to the jury.
The trial judge can only look at the evidence in the record. The appellate
court is subject to the same limitation. It may consider only the evidence
in the record and decide whether it is sufficient to support the jury's
verdict of guilt. The appellate court cannot selectively consider some
evidence and disregard other evidence. Nor can it reject some evidence
on the ground that it is not credible,94 or that the jury did not believe it.
The appellate court, like the trial court, should apply the standard in the
same way. The court should accept the credibility of the evidence and
the inferences in support of voluntary manslaughter, and then ask if there
was evidence sufficient to enable the jury to conclude that voluntary
manslaughter was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the court of
appeals was concerned about the apparent inconsistency between the selfdefense verdict and the voluntary manslaughter conviction, it should have
addressed that problem directly 95 instead of engaging in a speculative
exercise to decide what evidence should be considered in judging the
sufficiency of the evidence.
It is curious that the Melendez court ignored the Montano96 case and
the other New Mexico cases which state that where facts give rise to a
plea of self-defense, the accused may be convicted of voluntary manslaughter if the jury rejects the plea of self-defense. 97 As discussed above, 98
the doctrine of imperfect self-defense recognizes that the critical difference
between self-defense and voluntary manslaughter lies not in provocation
or the emotion of fear, but rather in the reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct in killing. The jury verdict in Melendez illustrates this distinction.
The jury could have believed that the defendant was provoked by the
occupants of Tegada's car earlier in the evening and that, just before the
fatal shot, the provocation was sufficient to arouse fear of death or great
bodily harm, but that the defendant's act of shooting and killing was not
94. See, e.g., State v. Seaton, 86 N.M. 498, 525 P.2d 858 (1974); State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 7,
419 P.2d 219 (1966); State v. Torres, 78 N.M. 597, 435 P.2d 216 (Ct. App. 1967); State v. Fagan,
78 N.M.618, 435 P.2d 771 (Ct. App. 1967).. According to the Supreme Court in Seaton, "The
question of credibility of the witnesses and their testimony is for the jury and not for us to decide,"
86 N.M. at 500, 525 P.2d 860.
95. For cases discussing the validity of inconsistent verdicts, see, e.g., United States v. Zane,
495 F.2d 683 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974); United States v. Scheper, 520 F.2d 1355
(4th Cir. 1975); State v. Padilla, 86 N.M. 282, 523 P.2d 17 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 281,
2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840, cert. denied, 402 U.S.
523 P.2d 16 (1974); People v. Hairston, 46 111.
972 (1970).
96. State v. Montano, 95 N.M. 233, 620 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1980).
97. State v. Harrison, 81 N.M. 623, 471 P.2d 193 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 81 N.M. 668, 472
P.2d 382 (1970); State v. Lopez, 79 N.M. 282, 442 P.2d 594 (1968); State v. Wright, 38 N.M. 427,
34 P.2d 870 (1934); State v. Kidd, 24 N.M. 572, 175 P. 772 (1917). See also supra notes 3-4, and
77 to 84, and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between self-defense and
voluntary manslaughter.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 77 through 93.
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reasonable under the circumstances. This view of the evidence, based on
inferences favorable to the jury's verdict, would support the manslaughter
conviction. By inferring that the jury disbelieved the provocation immediately prior to the killing, the Melendez case runs counter to the
doctrine of imperfect self-defense recognized in New Mexico. 99 The Melendez decision is unlikely to survive in view of contrary New Mexico
cases. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
court of appeals' decision.'
4. Defendant-Induced Provocation of Fear
In two cases, the supreme court affirmed murder convictions where
the trial court failed to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter and
the defendant's conduct played a role in causing the victim to induce fear
in the defendant. 0 ' In State v. Garcia,'o2 the defendant was the aggressor
in an altercation with the deceased. When the defendant pulled out a gun,
the deceased started to run away. The defendant then aimed the gun with
both hands, crouched slightly, hesitated, and fired a shot which killed the
victim. The defendant admitted that he had accomplished his purpose of
warning and scaring the victim before he aimed and fired. The supreme
court held that the circumstances of the shooting failed "to establish a
prima facie case for manslaughter... "' but failed to explain why.
One possible rationale for the result in Garcia may be that the court
found the evidence that the defendant was the aggressor in the quarrel
determinative, although the opinion does not explicitly rely on this factor. 10 If the court believed that the aggressor status of the defendant was
conclusive, it is unclear why the circumstances of the altercation were
not more fully described in order to demonstrate this fact. If this were
indeed the rationale in Garcia, the court did not explain why the fact that
a defendant was the aggressor in a quarrel with the victim should nec99. State v. Lopez, 79 N.M. 282, 442 P.2d 594 (1968); State v. Montano, 95 N.M. 233, 620
P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1980).
100. After this article was written, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
decision in Melendez. State v. Melendez, 97 N.M. 738, 643 P.2d 607 (1982).
101. State v. Garcia, 95 N.M. 260, 620 P.2d 1285 (1980); State v. Martinez, 95 N.M. 421, 622
P.2d 1041 (1981). One case outside New Mexico which addressed this issue is Edwards v. Regina
(1973] 1 All E.R. 152 (P.C. 1972), reprinted in part in S. Kadish and M. Paulsen, Criminal Law
and Its Processes 232 (3d ed. 1975). In Edwards the defendant killed the deceased, whom he was
trying to blackmail, when the deceased attacked the defendant with a knife. The trial judge rejected
the defendant's plea of provocation because the provocation was caused by the victim's reaction to
the blackmail attempt. The conviction was reversed on the ground that, when the hostile reaction
by the person sought to be blackmailed goes to extreme lengths, this might constitute sufficient
provocation even for the blackmailer.
102. 95 N.M. 260, 620 P.2d 1285 (1980).
103. Id. at 262, 620 P.2d at 1287.
104. The court did use the word "aggressor" in its description of the facts. Id. at 261, 620 P.2d
at 1286.
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essarily prevent a voluntary manslaughter instruction or conviction. An
intent to pick a fight is not the same as an intent to kill; nor does it
immunize an aggressor from fear or heat of passion.
Clearly, where the aggressor either tries to stop the fight or finds it
necessary to defend himself against unreasonable force by the victim of
his initial aggression, the aggressor may claim self-defense.105 Acts of
the victim in the course of an altercation with the defendant may provoke
the defendant to fear or rage. If, in responding to the defendant's aggression, the victim's acts involve the use of unreasonable force, the defendant's act of killing may amount to voluntary manslaughter under the
doctrine of imperfect self-defense. 10 If the defendant does not attempt
to end the fight or the victim does not use unreasonable force, it is not
clear whether the victim's reasonable defensive actions may be considered, as a matter of law, to be insufficient provocation. Perhaps Garcia
implicitly answers this question in the affirmative by rejecting the claim
that a manslaughter instruction was required where the victim ran away
from the defendant-aggressor.
A scenario involving the imperfect self-defense by an aggressor deserves further analysis. Suppose a defendant starts a fight with a victim.
The victim defends himself by using reasonable force only. During the
fight, the victim is prevailing and the defendant-aggressor fears serious
harm. Without abandoning the fight, the defendant then stabs and kills
the victim. This situation would not give rise to a self-defense claim
because the victim did not resort to unreasonable force. The issue of
whether these facts would amount to sufficient provocation to sustain a
conviction of voluntary manslaughter in the absence of a claim of selfdefense has not been addressed in New Mexico. One might conclude that
the aggressor forfeits his right to the mitigating effect of voluntary manslaughter in this situation when his acts cause the victim to provoke the
defendant. This position, however, ignores the circumstances of the altercation and removes from jury consideration whether the victim's acts
may cause fear or rage in a person of ordinary disposition. 0 7 Furthermore,
the use of "sudden quarrel" in the language of the statute' 0 8 suggests that
a fight, no matter who is the aggressor, may give rise to very strong
emotions that might result in a homicide. The statute does not approve
of such a killing, but it does recognize that a killing under such circumstances merits mitigation from murder to manslaughter. In summary,
aggressor status ought not to be determinative and automatically result
105. State v. Padilla, 90 N.M. 481, 565 P.2d 352 (1977) and N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41. 61 (1978).
106. See supra note 85 and accompanying text for a discussion of imperfect self-defense.
107. The sufficiency of provocation is measured by its effect on the ordinary person of average
disposition. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.22 (Supp. 1981).
108. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-3(A) (1978).
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in forfeiture of the mitigating defense of voluntary manslaughter. Instead,
the defendant's aggression should be considered by the jury in light of
the circumstances surrounding the killing when deciding whether provocation was sufficient.
Apart from the aggressor factor, Garcia might be rationalized on the
ground that the circumstances of the shooting afford no inference of fear.
Taking aim and shooting someone while he is running away does not
suggest fear on the part of the defendant. This explanation, however,
does not take into account other emotions0 9 which might have been
aroused by the immediately preceding altercation. The defendant might
have been so angered in the encounter with the victim that even when
the victim abandoned the altercation, rage and anger were still acting on
the defendant. Certainly the lapse of seconds would not be deemed sufficient time for those emotions to have cooled in the ordinary person. 110
Perhaps the court in Garcia focused entirely on the manner of the
killing and felt that these circumstances precluded the existence of an
extreme emotion. The manner of killing suggests a cool and deliberate
act. On the other hand, the evidence may also support the inference that
the killing was committed in the heat of anger. "' The latter inference
permits an instruction on voluntary manslaughter if the provocation was
adequate." 2 This inference is also permissible on the basis of circumstantial evidence. "' The defendant need not testify that he killed in the
heat of passion if the circumstances tend to show adequate provocation
of fear or other extreme emotion. 4
Because the court's reasoning is incomplete, Garcia is subject to a
number of interpretations. The case may have been decided correctly, but
it is impossible to discern whether the defendant's aggressor status or the
deliberate nature of the killing was the important factor in the decision.
The other case involving aggressive conduct by the defendant prior to
the alleged provocative acts of the victim is State v. Martinez."5 Evidence
was presented at trial that in the course of a robbery the defendant and
109. The Uniform Jury Instructions list emotions that are included within the statutory phrase,
"heat of passion." These emotions are anger, rage, fear, sudden resentment, terror, or other extreme
emotions. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.22 (Supp. 1981).
110. See infra notes 138 to 142 and accompanying text for a discussion of the New Mexico cases
which have addressed the issue of what period of time will amount to sufficient cooling time to
prevent a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
I 11. See supra text accompanying notes 109, 110.
112. State v. Garcia, 95 N.M. 260, 262, 620 P.2d 1285, 1287 (1980).
113. See, e.g., State v. Maestas, 95 N.M. 335, 662 P.2d 240 (1981); State v. Lujan, 94 N.M.
232, 608 P.2d 1114 (1980); State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979); State v. Montano,
95 N.M. 233, 620 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1980).
114. State v. Maestas, 95 N.M. 335, 622 P.2d 240 (1981); State v. Robinson, 94 N.M. 693, 616
P.2d 406 (1980); State v. Montano, 95 N.M. 233, 620 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1980).
115. 95 N.M. 421, 622 P.2d 1041 (1981).
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the victim, an employee of an auto sales shop, engaged in a struggle.
The accused and the deceased both suffered bruises, lacerations, and
gunshot wounds. The wounds on the body of the deceased included many
lacerations of the scalp, a fractured skull, a bullet wound in the left arm
and chest, and bruises and contusions on both forearms that were described by experts as defensive wounds. In addition, wire was found
wrapped around the victim's neck. The defendant suffered a severe hand
wound and multiple wounds on his legs and head.
The accused in Martinez claimed that the evidence of the struggle and
his serious wounds warranted instructions on self-defense and voluntary
manslaughter. The trial court refused to give the requested instructions,
and the defendant was convicted of both armed robbery and felony murder. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed both convictions.
Addressing the claim of self-defense, the supreme court held that the
evidence was insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the
defendant acted in self-defense. The court rejected the evidence of the
defendant's wounds as bearing on self-defense because it found that the
wounds had been inflicted by the defensive movements of the victim
when he resisted the offensive attack of the accused. The court held that
the struggle alone was insufficient to warrant a self-defense charge to the
jury. The supreme court apparently decided the self-defense issue by
deciding that the defendant was the aggressor in the struggle with the
victim. The court did not use the word "aggressor," however, nor did116it
cite any New Mexico cases which deny self-defense to an aggressor.
With respect to the voluntary manslaughter issue, the supreme court
rejected the defendant's claim that the evidence of the struggle and the
presence of wounds on the defendant were sufficient to require an instruction to the jury on manslaughter. Using the same reasoning it used
in rejecting self-defense, the court stated that the defendant's wounds
were "proof that the victim tried to defend himself against the defendant's
deadly attacks. Defendant's wounds alone do not constitute sufficient
evidence to support an inference of provocation or acts in the heat of
passion." 17 The court adopted the aggressor concept from the self-defense
analysis and applied it to voluntary manslaughter. The accused in Martinez
lost both the right to claim self-defense and the right to reduce his crime
from murder to manslaughter because, as aggressor, he caused the victim's
acts which induced the accused's fear.
Although the language of the opinion suggests that the defendant's
aggressor status was critical,' 18 the supreme court in Martinez did not
116.
117.
118.
victim

See, e.g., State v. Padilla, 90 N.M. 481, 565 P.2d 352 (1977).
State v. Martinez, 95 N.M. at 424, 622 P.2d at 1044.
The court stated "the fact that he [defendant] was injured constitutes some proof that the
may have struck and shot defendant. However, it also constitutes proof that the victim tried
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expressly rely on the aggressor doctrine to deny voluntary manslaughter
to the accused. The court did not expressly consider whether exceptions
to the aggressor doctrine in self-defense apply to voluntary manslaughter.
Presumably, a victim's use of unreasonable force or the accused's abandonment of the fight may restore the aggressor-accused's right to a voluntary manslaughter charge just as it restores his right to self-defense. 119
This would be consistent with the doctrine of imperfect self-defense,
which recognizes that a jury may logically decide the defendant acted in
the heat of passion but also acted unreasonably in killing. 20 This view
of the evidence would not exculpate, but would mitigate a murder charge
to manslaughter.
B. Provocation of Emotions Other Than Fear
The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed several murder convictions
in cases where the defendant killed a woman with whom he had had a
romantic involvement.' 2 In each case, the trial court refused the accused's
to defend himself against defendant's deadly attacks. Defendant's wounds alone do not constitute
sufficient evidence to support an inference of provocation or acts in the heat of passion." Id. at 424,
622 P.2d at 1044.
119. See, e.g., State v. Padilla, 90 N.M. 481, 565 P.2d 352 (1977). See also supra notes 104
to 108 and accompanying text for a discussion of aggressor status, and its relationship to voluntary
manslaughter.
120. See supra note 85 and accompanying text for a discussion of imperfect self-defense.
121. Two of the cases involving emotions other than fear, State v. Lujan, 94 N.M. 232, 608 P.2d
1114 (1980)and State v. Farris, 95 N.M. 96, 619 P.2d 541 (1980), are discussed fully in text. A
third case, State v. Robinson, 94 N.M. 693, 616 P.2d 406 (1980), discussed the same issue, but
contained so little evidence of actual provocation that it does not inform a general evidentiary standard.
Unlike Lujan and Farris, the evidence in Robinson disclosed neither words as provocation nor buildup of provocation during the relationship. The accused presented no evidence of provocation or heat
of passion because he claimed alibi. The state's evidence showed that the defendant and the victim
had dated sporadically for about one year. Several days before the homicide, the defendant and his
girlfriend broke up. On the evening of the killing, the accused saw his ex-girlfriend with another
man in a car and chased them at high speeds. When both cars stopped in front of the other man's
house, the accused shot the man and then shot his ex-girlfriend. He was convicted on two counts
of first degree murder for the deaths of the ex-girlfriend and the other man. Voluntary manslaughter
instructions were refused.
The supreme court in Robinson held that no instruction on manslaughter was justified or appropriate. The court acknowledged that the evidence of the defendant's seeing his former girlfriend
with another man "may support an inference of smoldering desire within the defendant to avenge
Christine dating another male by doing away with both of them, but it would not support an inference
of a 'sudden quarrel'. Nor can such facts be held to give rise to that provocation recognized in the
law as being adequate and proper to negate the presumption of malice." Id. at 701, 616 P.2d at
414.
The Robinson case properly rejected voluntary manslaughter as a mitigating defense. Unlike Lujan
and Farris, where there was evidence that the defendant's spouse had "cheated" on him, there was
no evidence in Robinson that the accused knew he had been wronged by his ex-girlfriend. Moreover,
there was no provoking incident in Robinson like those in Lujan and Farris. The sight of his former
girlfriend in a car with another man, in the absence of testimony by the accused as to provocation,
is insufficient circumstantial evidence to warrant an instruction of voluntary manslaughter.
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requests for voluntary manslaughter instructions. All three defendants
were convicted of murder, and the convictions were affirmed.
1. Words as Provocation
In State v. Lujan, 122 the defendant killed his ex-wife and her male
friend. On the evening of the killing the defendant was "taunted" by his
ex-wife. The words used by her in taunting the defendant were not described in the opinion. One hour later the defendant returned to the place
he had last seen his ex-wife and shot and killed her. Nearly one hour
later, he went to the home of his ex-wife's male friend and shot him.
The defense claimed that a build-up of stress due to his wife's infidelity,
a divorce, and worries about his children contributed to his emotional
outburst on the evening of the killings. The trial court, however, excluded
evidence which tended to support this theory-testimony that the defendant knew of his ex-wife's adultery with the male friend and testimony
that the ex-wife contracted venereal disease from someone other than the
defendant. The accused requested an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, but the trial judge denied the request. The jury convicted the defendant
of first degree murder of both his former wife and her friend.
The supreme court, applying the test of Smith'23 and Trujillo'24 to the
evidence, held that there was no evidence that the homicide was committed either in the heat of passion or upon a sudden quarrel. The court
rejected the evidence of taunting by the ex-wife because "words alone
provocation to reduce a murder charge to voluntary
cannot be sufficient
25
manslaughter." 1
The court followed prior New Mexico cases in holding that words
alone are insufficient provocation. ' 26 This doctrine, however, imposes an
unnecessary limitation on the use of voluntary manslaughter as a mitigating defense. To say that words alone cannot amount to adequate provocation is to deny to the jury the assessment of whether the words, by
themselves, might "arouse anger, rage, fear, sudden resentment, terror
or other extreme emotions . . . such as would affect the ability to reason
and to cause a temporary loss of self control in an ordinary person of
average disposition. "' 27 Words can indeed inflict emotional injury. Racial
122. 94 N.M. 232, 608 P.2d 1114 (1980).
123. 89 N.M. 770, 558 P.2d 39 (1976). The judicial test for deciding whether a voluntary
manslaughter instruction is required is discussed in the text accompanying notes 23 to 40, supra.
124. 27 N.M. 594, 203 P.846 (1921).
125. State v. Lujan, 94 N.M. 232, 234, 608 P.2d 1114, 1116 (1980).
126. State v. Farris, 95 N.M. 96, 619 P.2d 541 (1980); State v. Nevares, 36 N.M. 41, 7 P.2d
933 (1932); State v. Trujillo, 27 N.M. 594, 203 P. 846 (1921); State v. Montano, 95 N.M. 233,
620 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1980); State v. Castro, 92 N.M. 585, 592 P.2d 185 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
92 N.M. 621, 593 P.2d 62 (1979).
127. N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 2.22 (Supp. 1981).
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epithets, for example, may be far more provocative than a simple assault
accompanied by threats. If the recipient of the words perceives that the
words were intended to provoke, his emotional response may be extreme.
To accept words as sufficient provocation will not necessarily permit
an unwarranted expansion of voluntary manslaughter as a mitigating defense. Human nature responds to many kinds of incitement. It is artificial
to exclude words from the types of provocation which will allow a reduction from murder to manslaughter.' 28 The proper limitation should be
the test of the ordinary person with an average disposition.' 29 This objective test would eliminate those claims of provocation which do not
deserve the benefit of the mitigating effect of voluntary manslaughter. It
is important to remember that the provocation formula does not exculpate;
it merely reduces the degree of the crime.
Although the opinion in Lujan does not disclose the content of the exwife's words, the description of the words as "taunting" suggests that
their purpose was to provoke the defendant. If the taunt referred to the
ex-wife's infidelity and adultery and reflected on the defendant's cuckoldry, a jury might reasonably find that such words would arouse the
passion of the ordinary person.
In Lujan, the supreme court did not consider that evidence of the prior
relationship between the defendant and his former wife had any bearing
on the issue of provocation, although prior provoking events were considered relevant in measuring the sufficiency of the evidence in State v.
Benavidez. 30
' The court assumed that the ex-wife's taunting of the accused
was the only evidence of provocation, and concluded that words alone
are not sufficient provocation. It ignored the possibility that evidence of
the wife's adultery and the divorce may have supported an inference of
a build-up of provocation over time that culminated in the taunting words
that ignited the defendant's pent-up emotions. In fact, the court upheld
the trial court's evidentiary ruling which excluded evidence of the wife's
adultery during the marriage, although this was known by the defendant.
The rejection of past provocations in Lujan, like the rejection of such
evidence in Farris,131 prevents consideration of the provocation issue in
context and ignores the build-up of emotions which can precede the final
provocative act.
128. S. Kadish and M. Paulsen, Criminal Law and Its Processes (3d. ed. 1975), suggest that this
limitation cannot be justified. Kadish and Paulsen note that the Model Penal Code does not impose
such a limitation and that the Homicide Act of England abandoned it. See also, Annot., 2 A.L.R.
3d, 1292 (1965); Note, Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation: The Reasonableness of the
Reasonable Man, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021 (1958); and W. LaFave and A. Scott, Criminal Law 578
(1972), on this issue.
129. See supra note 12 for a discussion of the reasonable ordinary person test.
130. 94 N.M. 706, 616 P.2d 419 (1981). See supra notes 104 to 135 and accompanying text for
a discussion of build-up of provocation.
131. State v. Farris, 95 N.M. 96, 97, 619 P.2d 541, 542 (1980).
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32
involved the killing of a spouse,
Like the Lujan case, State v. Farris'
a build-up of provocation during a stormy marriage, and words of provocation. The defendant in Farrisshot and killed his estranged wife after
a quarrel, in which the wife poked the defendant in the chest and told
him to leave her boyfriend alone and that the boyfriend could come into
the house anytime he wanted. After discounting the relevancy of the prior
provoking circumstances of their marital relationship of 20 years, 33 the
supreme court stated that words alone are inadequate provocation, and
alone' is
held that the "mere addition of poking the chest to 'words
1' 34
[in]sufficient to show provocation at the time of killing.'
The supreme court in Farris not only denied the provocative effect
which words may have but also denied the added effect that words may
have when accompanied by provocative conduct. Poking someone in the
chest during a quarrel is hardly an innocuous act. It accentuates the nature
of the words and heightens the emotional response to those words. Furthermore, when the words and the poking are considered in the context
of the history of the wife's attachment to "boyfriends" during the course
of marriage, it is difficult to understand why the evidence in Farriswas
insufficient to present to the jury the question of voluntary manslaughter.
Perhaps even more than the accused in Lujan, the defendant in Farris,
because of the poking, deserved the opportunity to present his claim for
mitigation to the jury. Whether the ordinary person, under the circumstances confronting the accused, would have been aroused to passion
which would affect his ability to reason, and whether that would cause
a temporary loss of control, should be a jury decision. It is inappropriate
for the courts to remove the issue of sufficient provocation from jury
consideration simply because the evidence of provocation includes "words
alone" or "the mere addition of poking in the chest."
It is unfortunate that the New Mexico courts conclude that words cannot
amount to sufficient provocation because that conclusion precludes the
jury's consideration of the adequacy of the provocation. Comparing taunting words in Lujan and the words and poking in Farriswith the types
' Benavidez, 3' 6 and Montano'3 7 cases, all
of provocation in the Maestas, 35
of which required voluntary manslaughter instructions, it is difficult to
see how the defendants in those cases were any more entitled to present

132. Id.
133. This issue is discussed in the text accompanying notes 64 to 71, supra.
134. 95 N.M. at 97, 619 P.2d at 542.
135. State v. Maestas, 95 N.M. 335, 336-37, 622 P.2d 240, 241-242 (1981) (intoxicated victim
staggered or lunged toward car and leaned into car window).
136. State v. Benavidez, 94 N.M. 706, 708, 616 P.2d 419, 421 (1980) (victim's gesture could
have been attempt to strike or move for weapon).
137. State v. Montano, 95 N.M. 233, 236, 620 P.2d 887, 890 (Ct. App. 1980) (victim became
angry, looked threateningly at defendant, and rose from chair).
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their claims for mitigation to the jury than were the defendants in Lujan
or Farris.
2. Cooling Time
If there is a distinction between Lujan and the three cases listed above,
it is in the existence of cooling time rather than in the type of provocation.
In Lujan, the accused killed his former wife one hour after the initial
provocation and killed her paramour one hour after that. In Maestas,
Benavidez, and Montano, the killings occurred immediately after the
provocation.
Voluntary manslaughter requires more than the concurrence of sufficient provocation and heat of passion. It requires that the act of killing
be within a period of time after the sufficient38 provocation before the
"ordinary person would have cooled off.. . . " The courts have deemed
time lapses of three and one-half hours,' 39 three hours,' 4 ° one hour and
forty minutes,' 4 ' and forty minutes'42 to be too long even to present a
jury question as to whether the ordinary person would have cooled off.
A cooling-off period of at least forty minutes will prevent in New Mexico,
as a matter of law, a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
3. Significance of Emotions Other Than Fear
According to the appellate courts, none of the three cases in which the
defendants claimed provocation of extreme emotions other than fear re' The supreme court held
quired instructions on voluntary manslaughter. 43
that the evidence in each case was insufficient to warrant submission of
voluntary manslaughter to the jury. Furthermore, no New Mexico appellate decision of which the author is aware has ever said that a voluntary
manslaughter charge was either erroneously withheld from the jury or
correctly given to the jury where the evidence showed a killing due to
an emotion other than fear. '" The failure of New Mexico courts to approve
evidence of "other emotion" provocation as sufficient to raise the issue
of manslaughter suggests their reluctance to accord the same significance
138. N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 2.22 (Supp. 1981).
139. State v. Trujillo, 27 N.M. 594, 203 P. 846 (1921).
140. State v.Melendez, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 387 (Ct. App., Feb. 12, 1981).
141. State v. Nevares, 36 N.M. 41, 7 P.2d 933 (1932).
142. State v. Castro, 92 N.M. 585, 592 P.2d 185 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 621, 593
P.2d 62 (1979).
143. State v. Farris, 95 N.M. 96, 619 P.2d 541 (1980); State v. Robinson, 94 N.M. 693, 616
P.2d 406 (1980); State v. Lujan, 94 N.M. 232, 608 P.2d 1114 (1980).
144. In addition to the three cases discussed in the text and cited in note 143, supra, see, e.g.,
State v. Nevarez, 36 N.M. 41,7 P.2d 933 (1932); State v. Trujillo, 27 N.M. 594, 203 P. 846 (1921);
State v. Castro, 92 N.M. 585, 592 P.2d 185 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 621, 593 P.2d 62
(1979).
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to such provocation that the courts give to provocation of fear. 4 5 The
courts have relied on the doctrines of "cooling time" and "words as
insufficient provocation" to avoid recognizing that emotions other than
fear can serve as the basis of a voluntary manslaughter instruction. This
reluctance is hard to understand in view of the statutory language and
the Uniform Jury Instructions, neither of which limits the type of passion
or emotion which will permit murder to be reduced to manslaughter. If
the reason for this reluctance is the notion that the ordinary person would
be less likely to be moved to kill by emotions such as jealousy, rage, or
anger than he would be moved to kill by fear, the New Mexico courts
are infringing on the jury's function of applying the ordinary person test
to the evidence of provocation. Jurors,
coming from the various classes and occupations of society, and
conversant with the practical affairs of life, are . . . much better
qualified to judge of the sufficiency and tendency of a given provocation and much more likely to fix, with some degree of accuracy,
the standard of what constitutes the average of ordinary human nature, than the judge whose habits and course of life give him much
less experience of the workings of passion in the actual conflicts of
life.14
C. Lawful Acts as Provocation
In several cases, the New Mexico courts have focused on the legality
of the provoking conduct of the victim rather than on the emotional
reaction of the defendant to the victim's provocation. The courts crystallized this focus in an additional rule for assessing the sufficiency of
provocation-lawful acts by the victim cannot amount to sufficient provocation to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
The genesis of this rule was a 1979 decision by the New Mexico
Supreme Court. In State v. Manus, ,47 the court stated that lawful acts of
a police officer can never rise to the level of sufficient provocation. In
Manus, police officer Wasmer had arrested the accused's wife for driving
violations. The defendant approached the police car with a loaded shotgun. The shotgun discharged, inflicting wounds from which Officer Wasmer died.
145. Compare the so-called "unwritten law" in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-4 (1953), repealed in
1973 after passage of the New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment. 1973 N.M. Laws, ch. 241, § 6.
The unwritten law provided not a partial defense, but a full defense to a homicide prosecution where
a male defendant killed his spouse or her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse.
146. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am. Dec. 781 (1862). The court in Maher added that
the judge must to some extent decide upon the sufficiency of the alleged provocation. Only "when
it is so clear as to admit of no reasonable doubt upon any theory that the alleged provocation could
not have had any tendency to produce such a state of mind, in ordinary men" may the judge properly
keep the issue from the jury. Id. at 220, 81 Am. Dec. at 786.
147. 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979).
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At trial, prosecution and defense presented conflicting testimony conceming the shooting. The defendant testified that on the night of the
shooting he had taken the shotgun out of his house to investigate what
he thought might be prowlers. He approached the police car to report
suspected prowlers. He was blinded by the lights of the police car and
he was shot at from behind the light. He then fired his own gun. He did
not remember firing the shotgun, and did not testify that he was in fear.
Charged with the first degree murder of Officer Wasmer, Manus submitted
an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The trial court refused the
instruction and Manus was convicted of first degree murder.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed the first degree murder
conviction and rejected the claim that the evidence warranted an instruction to the jury on voluntary manslaughter. The court considered that the
only evidence which might show sufficient provocation was the defendant's testimony, which was controverted,' 4 8 that Officer Wasmer fired the
first shot. The court concluded that the defendant's version of the shooting
was insufficient provocation as a matter of law.
The supreme court stated that "[a]cts of a peace officer exercising his
duties in a lawful manner cannot rise to the level of sufficient provocation." 49 The supreme court acknowledged that the issue of whether the
police officer used excessive force was normally a jury question, but
stated that the defendant bore the burden of introducing evidence to
establish sufficient provocation. In the absence of any evidence to show
that the officer's act of shooting at the defendant was unreasonable or
involved the use of excessive force, the court concluded that the defendant
failed to introduce sufficient evidence of provocation to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
The supreme court did not explain why the lawful acts of a police
officer can never give rise to sufficient provocation. The court simply
cited several cases from other jurisdictions.' 50 These cases do not appear
to bear the weight that the court has placed on them.
Two cases on which the court relied stated that a lawful arrest cannot
amount to sufficient provocation. 51 These cases involved unsuccessful
148. The state's evidence showed that the defendant was angry about Officer Wasmer's stopping
his wife, got his shotgun and approached the police cars at a trot. He had some words with the
officers. When he was told to put his shotgun down, the defendant pointed his gun at the officers
and fired at Wasmer. Id. at 100, 597 P.2d at 285.
149. Id.
150. The court cited the following cases: People v. Roman, 256 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 656, 64
Cal. Rptr. 268 (Ct. App. 1967); Suhay v. United States, 95 F.2d 890 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 304
U.S. 580 (1938); State v. Nolan, 354 Mo. 980, 192 S.W.2d 1016 (1946).
15 1. Two of the cases cited dealt with arrests as provocation. The defendants in both cases claimed
that an unlawful arrest warranted an instruction on voluntary manslaughter where the defendant
killed the arresting officer. People v. Roman, 256 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 268, 64 Cal. Rptr. 268 (Ct.
App. 1967); Suhay v. United States, 95 F. 2d 890 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 580 (1938).
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claims of unlawful arrest. They are not analogous, however, to the claimed
provocation in Manus. The defendant in Manus did not assert that his
request for a voluntary manslaughter charge was premised on an illegal
arrest." 2 Instead, he claimed that the officer's shooting at him was the
provocative act. Furthermore, the emotional reaction to an unlawful arrest
may be quite different from the response to being the target of a firearm.
A person who believes he is being illegally detained may display anger
or rage. On the other hand, fear may be the predominant emotion of one
who is the target of a bullet.
The result in Manus might be better supported by an analysis of who
caused the assault. The claimed provocation in Manus is like the defensive
conduct of the victim in State v. Martinez,'5 3 where the court refused a
voluntary manslaughter conviction on the ground that the defendant caused
' Like the defendant
the conduct which he then claimed was provocation. 54
in Martinez, the defendant in Manus may be said to have caused the
victim to respond as he did. Manus approached the police car at night
carrying a shotgun. This conduct might reasonably have caused Officer
Wasmer to believe that his own life was in danger. If Officer Wasmer
then shot at Manus, the fear experienced by Manus was thus caused by
his own actions.
The court also viewed the provocation as caused by the defendant. The
court in Manus quoted Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure'55 to the
effect that a defendant forfeits the defense of provocation when he intentionally causes the victim to do acts that allegedly provoke the deIn one case the court accepted the legal premise that an unlawful arrest would amount to sufficient
provocation but found that the arrest of the defendant was lawful. 256 Cal. App. 2d at 271. In the
second case involving an arrest, the federal court stated that no arrest, lawful or unlawful, could be
sufficient provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. 95 F.2d at 895.
The other case cited by the New Mexico Supreme Court involved facts closer to those in Manus,
but that case offered no support for the court's position. In State v. Nolan, 354 Mo. 980, 192 S.W.2d
1016 (1946) an officer was arresting the defendant for committing a felony. The defendant ran and
the officer chased him and fired at him. The defendant returned the fire and killed the officer. The
court in Nolan rejected a self-defense claim but upheld the voluntary manslaughter conviction where
, 192 S.W.2d
the officer acted lawfully in using deadly force to stop an escaping felon. Id. at __
at 1021-1022.
152. Some jurisdictions view an illegal arrest as sufficient to arouse a heat of passion in the
reasonable person. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 575 (1972) and the cases cited therein.
See also Annot., 66 A.L.R. 353 (1905); Moreland, The Use of Force in Effecting or Resisting Arrest,
33 Neb. L. Rev. 408 (1954); Dickey, Culpable Homicides in Resisting Arrest, 18 Corn. L.Q. 373,
375-76 (1933).
Other jurisdictions, however, reject an illegal arrest as sufficient provocation on the ground that
a reasonable person could not be aroused to a heat of passion by an illegal arrest. See W. LaFave
& A. Scott, Criminal Law at 575.
153. 95 N.M. 421, 622 P.2d 1041 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 115 to 120 for a
discussion of the Martinez case.
154. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
155. T. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, § 276 (1957).
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fendant. 56 The court did not indicate whether defendant-induced provocation
was a separate ground for its decision' 57 or whether the defendant's acts
were merely relevant in determining whether the victim's acts were lawful. The discussion of the legality of Wasmer's conduct immediately
following the quotation about the defendant-caused provocation suggests,
however, that the court viewed the defendant's conduct as bearing on the
legality of the officer's exercise of force. The court may have seen the
defendant's conduct of approaching a police car at night with a shotgun
15 8
as creating a lawful justification for Wasmer's defensive actions.
The court in Manus apparently viewed the adequacy of provocation as
dependent upon the lawfulness of the victim's conduct together with a
consideration of who caused the chain of reactions leading to death. The
Manus decision may indicate that if the defendant causes a victim to fight
back or to respond with reasonable force in self-defense, the victim's acts
will not constitute sufficient provocation. It is clear from Manus that a
lawful arrest or the lawful exercise of force in making a lawful arrest
will be insufficient provocation in any event.
The decision in Manus stated the "lawful act" doctrine in terms of the
lawful acts of a peace officer. The court's reliance on the defendantinduced provocation, however, signaled that it might apply the lawful
provocation rule to non-police victims. Three years later, in State v.
Marquez,'5 9 the New Mexico Court of Appeals extended the Manus rule
to include a victim who was not a peace officer and whose provocation
consisted of acts in defense of herself or her home.
The claimed provocation in Marquez was the victim's act of throwing
a vase at the accused. The defendant broke into the home of the victim,
a former girlfriend, picked up a knife in the kitchen, and awaited her
return. When the victim and her mother arrived home, the defendant
confronted them in the den. The victim became angry and accused the
defendant of breaking into the house. According to the defendant's testimony, he argued with the victim about a date she had. He then ordered
her to sit by him. When she refused, he began stabbing her. She broke
away and ran, but he caught up with her in the kitchen. She then threw
a vase at him.
156. The quotation appears in State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 100, 597 P.2d 280, 284 (1979).
157. See supra notes 112-120 and accompanying text for a discussion of other New Mexico
cases that have rejected defendant-induced provocation as sufficient to merit an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter.
158. The court did not specifically find that the defendant's acts justified Wasmer's conduct because
the court said that it was the defendant's burden to show that the officer's act was unlawful. In the
absence of evidence on this issue, the court assumed that Officer Wasmer's conduct was legal. 93
N.M. at 101, 597 P.2d at 284 (1979).
159. 96 N.M. 746, 634 P.2d 1298 (Ct. App. 1981).
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The victim's mother testified that her daughter threw the vase at the
defendant when he first entered the den where they were seated. The
defendant continued into the room and sat down. According to the mother,
the defendant took out a knife and began stabbing the victim only after
the two of them refused to lie down in front of him as he ordered.
The defendant was tried for murder. He requested an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter. The trial court denied the request, and the defendant was convicted of second degree murder.
The court in Marquez held that neither version of the vase-throwing
incident was sufficient provocation to submit a voluntary manslaughter
charge to the jury. The court stated that because the defendant's testimony
established that the vase was thrown after the stabbing had begun, the
victim's act in no way provoked the accused. Looking at the mother's
version, the court concluded that the assault with a vase did not provoke
the defendant because the defendant did not react to it. Instead, he continued into the den and sat down. Only after the victim and her mother
refused to lie down as he ordered did he react by stabbing. The provocation
was the non-compliance with the defendant's commands, rather than the
thrown vase.
Although the court of appeals could have dismissed the defendant's
claim of provocation on the above grounds, it went further and added
that even if the assault with the vase provoked the defendant, it was not
adequate provocation. The court found that the victim was exercising a
legal right in throwing the vase at the accused. The defendant, according
to the court, was a burglar for breaking into the house, and the victim
had the right to throw the vase in defense of herself or her home. Citing
Manus, the court stated that "the exercise of a legal right, no matter how
offensive, is not provocation adequate to reduce homicide from murder
to manslaughter." 6 o
The court in Marquez also suggested another ground for rejecting the
asserted provocation. It noted that the victim's provocation was induced
by the defendant. "If there was any provocation, it was not brought about
by . . . throwing a vase, but by defendant's illegal entry into . . . [the]
home. "161
Neither the Manus court nor the Marquez court explained why the
lawfulness of a victim's conduct should be determinative in rejecting the
mitigation that voluntary manslaughter offers. Nor is it clear as a matter
of policy that the legality of the victim's act should preclude a man160. Id. at 749, 634 P.2d at 1301.
161. Id.The court in State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979) also relied on the fact
that the defendant's conduct caused the victim's lawful response. See supra notes 101-120 and
accompanying text for a discussion of defendant-induced provocation.
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slaughter instruction. 61 2 Neither the statute nor the Uniform Jury Instructions suggest that the defense function of voluntary manslaughter is available
only when the provoking acts are unlawful.
The court in Manus did not advance policy reasons in support of its
rule that lawful conduct by a peace officer is insufficient provocation. If
the unstated justification for such a rule is the protection of an officer in
the lawful discharge of his duties, this policy is not served by depriving
the defendant of the availability of voluntary manslaughter. The defendant
who kills in the heat of passion is not deterred by the lawfulness of his
provoker's conduct. Deterrence assumes the ability to reason or react
rationally to events. A person committing voluntary manslaughter, by
definition, responds emotionally, not reasonably. Thus, it is difficult to
see how the court's rule furthers a policy of protection of police officers.
It is equally difficult to perceive any other policy justification for the
lawful act doctrine.
Courts which hold that an arrest can never amount to sufficient provocation assume that a reasonable man could never be provoked by the
circumstances of an arrest. This assumption is not always a tenable one.
For instance, an undercover police agent may be given orders to arrest
a known criminal who is believed to be armed and dangerous. The undercover agent then spots the defendant, whom he mistakenly believes
to be the wanted criminal, but who is in fact an innocent person. Without
a warning to the defendant, the agent jumps the defendant and wrestles
him to the ground in an attempt to gain control of him. Largely out of
anger, and perhaps partly out of fear, the defendant reacts to this assault
by wielding a knife and stabbing to death his attacker, who unbeknownst
to the defendant, is an officer of the law. Though the officer was acting
in the line of duty to make the arrest, this would appear to be a situation
in which a jury might reasonably find that the acts of the arresting officer
were provocation sufficient to cause even a reasonable man to experience
the same emotions which the defendant manifested when he was assaulted. It is possible that an arrest as described above might provoke
even a reasonable man into a heat of passion. It thus becomes clear that
the sweeping rule that an arrest, lawful or otherwise, can never amount
to sufficient provocation, may serve injustice to defendants in certain
circumstances.
162. The authorities who discuss the issue of an arrest as provocation do not question the doctrine
that a lawful arrest cannot amount to adequate provocation. Nor do they provide much explanation
of the development and rationale underlying this rule. The focus of these discussions is the issue of
whether an illegal arrest may be sufficient provocation. See, e.g., W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra
note 152, at 575. Model Penal Code and Commentaries 58 (Part 11, 1980); Dickey, supra, note 152,
at 375-376.
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Two other examples highlight the invalidity of the "lawful-unlawful
act" distinction as a factor in measuring the adequacy of provocation. A
lawful search of an innocent person's home by a police officer who
lawfully destroys valued possessions'63 might reasonably arouse a heat
of passion in the reasonable man. If the innocent person kills the officer
in the heat of passion, the factors other than the lawful search may be
significant in assessing the reasonableness of the emotional reaction. To
shield some highly provocative acts behind the legality of the conduct is
to deny the mitigating effect of voluntary manslaughter.
On the other hand, an unlawful arrest may involve no provocation, yet
the New Mexico rule might permit a voluntary manslaughter conviction
simply because the arrest was unlawful. For example, suppose a uniformed officer hands a defendant an arrest warrant, advises him he is
under arrest and attempts to escort the defendant to the police cruiser.
The defendant becomes provoked with the officer's attempt, struggles
with the officer and kills him. The New Mexico rule suggests that if there
was a defect in that attempted arrest the accused would be entitled to a
voluntary manslaughter instruction. Yet a defect in an arrest might result
from so technical a thing as an invalid warrant, which would have little
or no effect on the emotions of the reasonable person. Predicating a
defendant's right to a voluntary manslaughter instruction on the validity
of the warrant gives undue significance to the illegality of the conduct
and ignores the circumstances manifesting the presence or absence of
adequate provocation.
The purpose served by voluntary manslaughter does not support the
"lawful act" doctrine. Voluntary manslaughter is designed to afford an
accused a measure of mitigation when he kills in the heat of passion upon
adequate provocation. 164 Whether the provocation is lawful or unlawful
should not be determinative. The legality of the victim's conduct is a
factor in considering the sufficiency of the provocation, but it is one
circumstance of many which surround the events that lead to the killing.
Singling out the lawfulness of the victim's conduct imposes a new element
of voluntary manslaughter-that the victim's provocation be unlawful.
No such element is suggested by the statute. 165 To add such a requirement
would deprive the jury of its function in evaluating the reasonableness
of the defendant's emotional reaction to the provocation. The circumstance that the victim was acting lawfully should be but one factor for
163. For example, a search for drugs could legitimately include looking into picture frames or
other valuable items.
164. The Model Penal Code Commentary on the crime of manslaughter recognizes that provocation is a concession to human weakness and that inquiry into the reasons for an actor's formulation
of an intent to kill will sometimes reveal factors that should have significance in grading.
165. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-3(A) (1978).
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the jury to consider. The mitigating function of voluntary manslaughter,
focusing as it does on the reasonableness of the defendant's passion,
would suggest that the victim's conduct may be relevant to the assessment
of the reasonableness of the defendant's emotional response. The acts of
the victim, if lawful, should not be conclusive.
An additional reason opposes the court's lawful act doctrine. Defendants may not know the subtleties which make an arrest or a search lawful
or unlawful. Even police officers are often forced in the heat of the moment
to guess whether their conduct will be judged with hindsight to be lawful. 166 Defendants who kill in the heat of passion are even less likely to
know, evaluate, or think about the lawfulness of the victim's claimed
provocation. A requirement of illegal provocation for voluntary manslaughter would impose a factor which is not ascertainable at the moment
of the homicide and which is extraneous to an assessment of the defendant's culpability. Even if defendant is cognizant of the legality of the
victim's conduct, a defendant may mistakenly believe that the victim's
act is unlawful. A court's subsequent determination that the victim acted
legally should not prevent a defendant from attempting to persuade a jury
that a reasonable person would have thought that the victim's acts were
unlawful and would have been provoked similarly into a heat of passion.
Even self-defense does not require that the victim be an incontrovertible
threat of imminent danger to the defendant. A reasonable belief that one's
life is in danger is sufficient to raise self-defense,' 67 even if the victim
presented no actual threat and acted lawfully.
The recent adoption of the lawful act doctrine in New Mexico runs
counter to the modem trend to leave the evaluation of the adequacy of
provocation to the jury. Courts in the past tended to restrict narrowly the
types of provoking circumstances which could be submitted for jury
consideration.' 68 This traditional view did not permit a jury to find provocation and return a manslaughter conviction "in any and all situations

166. The court in Manus recognized the difficulty of determining the legality of police conduct
when it quoted from Mead v. O'Connor, 66 N.M. 170, 173, 344 P.2d 478, 480 (1959), a passage
which said that courts "recognize the fact that emergencies arise when the officer cannot be expected
to exercise that cool and deliberate judgment which courts and juries exercise afterwards upon
investigations in court." 93 N.M. at 100, 597 P.2d at 285.
167. The first element of the Uniform Jury Instruction on self-defense states: "There was an
(emphasis added) N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.41 (Supp.
appearance of immediate danger of death.
1981).
168. See S.Kadish & M. Paulsen, Criminal Law and Its Processes 225 (3d ed. 1975); W. LaFave
& A. Scott, Criminal Law 574 (1972); Model Penal Code and Commentaries 57-58 (Part II, 1980).
For example, "words alone, no matter how insulting, could not amount to adequate provocation."
Id. at 58. New Mexico, likewise, does not permit provocation by words to be submitted to a jury.
See supra notes 122-137 and accompanying text for a discussion of the New Mexico rule on words
as provocation.
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in which
the jury should find the circumstances reasonably provoca69
tive. "1
There is a growing trend to sweep away these rigid rules limiting
provocation to only certain circumstances. 7 ° The Model Penal Code' 7 '
and many jurisdictions' have abandoned the preconceived notions as to
what is sufficient provocation.
The question of whether a lawful arrest can amount to adequate provocation should be one for the jury, not the judge, to decide. Juries are
much better qualified to judge the emotional reaction of the reasonable
' If the defendant reasonably believes he is being wantonly asperson. 73
saulted when in truth an officer is merely attempting lawfully to arrest
him, and the defendant kills in response to the situation as he perceives
it, he should be at least permitted to present his case to the trier of fact.
Carving out a broad categorical exception based on the legal status of
the victim's conduct, would, in some instances, unjustly deprive a defendant of a defense to which he should be entitled.
V. CONCLUSION
The lawful arrest rule sets up yet another barrier to obtaining a voluntary
manslaughter instruction in New Mexico. Further, the application of the
Smith-Trujillo test to the evidence in the cases which are the subject of
this article indicates that it is generally difficult to have voluntary manslaughter submitted to the jury in a murder prosecution in New Mexico.
The Smith-Trujillo test, which requires evidence sufficient to support a
conviction as a condition for a voluntary manslaughter instruction, sets
such a high standard of proof that it is difficult to meet except in the selfdefense situation. Furthermore, this test produces the "grotesque outcome"' 74
of complete discharge of the accused where the trial judge miscalculates
the sufficiency of the evidence. The remedy of complete discharge for
incorrectly submitting voluntary manslaughter to the jury has provided
an incentive for trial judges to refuse instructions on this issue. 7 5 The
effect of the Smith-Trujillo test, as it has been applied recently, has been
169. S. Kadish and M. Paulson, Criminal Law and Its Processes, at 225.
170. Id. at 226; See also W. LaFave and A. Scott, Criminal Law, at 575.
171. Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 210.3 (Part II, 1980). The Comment to § 210.3
indicates the intent of the Model Penal Code to abandon rigid rules of provocation. Id. at 61.
172. See the list of jurisdictions included in S. Kadish and M. Paulson, Criminal Law and Its
Processes, at 226. England has also decided to leave the issue of the adequacy of provocation to
the jury. See English Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, Part I, § 3.
173. See the quotation from Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am. Dec. 781 (1862) which
appears in the text accompanying note 146, supra.
174. State v. Melendez, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 387, 391 (Feb. 12, 1981).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 23 to 60.
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the disparagement of voluntary manslaughter as a mitigating defense.
Taken together with the lawful arrest rule and the provocative words
doctrine, the Smith-Trujillo test means that a voluntary manslaughter
instruction is not used in New Mexico as often as it should be.
The recent cases suggest the need for re-examination of the role of
voluntary manslaughter in the New Mexico homicide scheme. The dual
purpose of manslaughter in New Mexico has created problems for the
courts. When trial courts permit voluntary manslaughter to serve as a
mitigating defense to murder, appellate courts often reverse the convictions. When the trial courts view voluntary manslaughter more as a separate and distinct crime, the defendant is deprived of its mitigating purpose.
The solution lies in removing the conflict in the roles. Voluntary manslaughter could serve both functions without an inherent conflict if it were
redefined to be a true lesser included offense of murder. For example, if
voluntary manslaughter required an intent to kill, while murder were
defined to require an intent to kill plus the absence of heat of passion
due to adequate provocation, the tension which currently exists would
disappear. Voluntary manslaughter could then operate as both a mitigating
defense and a crime at the same time. The drafters of the Uniform Jury
Instructions attempted such a compromise in the instructions on murder
and voluntary manslaughter. Instructions, however, cannot change the
statutory definition of voluntary manslaughter. The responsibility rests
with the legislature. The homicide law in New Mexico should be revised
to resolve the contradiction in the murder-manslaughter scheme.

